Unfettering the political mandate: reflections on political prohibition, the world bank’s role in the protection of human rights and the chad – Cameroon pipeline by Kirunda, Robert
  1
 
 
UNFETTERING THE POLITICAL MANDATE: REFLECTIONS ON 
POLITICAL PROHIBITION, THE WORLD BANK’S ROLE IN THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
AND  
THE CHAD – CAMEROON PIPELINE 
 
 
KIRUNDA ROBERT 
    STUDENT NO: 2669662 
 
Supervisor:  Adv. M.S. Wandrag 
 
 
A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW 
(MODE II) IN THE FACULTY OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN 
CAPE. 
 
SEPTEMBER 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2
TITLE 
 
Unfettering the Political Mandate: Reflections on Political Prohibition, The World 
Bank’s Role In the Protection of Human Rights and The Chad – Cameroon Pipeline. 
 
 
KEYWORDS. 
 
Political Prohibition, World Bank Group, World Bank Mandate, Human Rights 
Approach, Human Rights protection, Articles of Agreement, Chad – Cameroon Pipeline.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  3
 
DECLARATION 
 
I declare that, Unfettering the Political Mandate: Reflections on Political Prohibition, 
The World Bank’s Role In the Protection of Human Rights and The Chad – 
Cameroon Pipeline  is my own work, that it has never been submitted before for any 
degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or 
quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references. 
  
Robert Kirunda 
 
 
Signed: …………………………    September 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  4
ACKNOWELEDGEMENT 
First and most importantly, I am deeply thankful to our Heavenly Father for the 
opportunity to study this Masters course, for all the tremendous successes that I achieved 
along the way, the humility to write this work, the joy that came with the good times of 
the course and for the strength and comfort of His Spirit to endure and weather the tough 
times. To Him alone and to Christ His son do I give all Glory Laud and Honor.  
 
I am indebted beyond calculation to Advocate Maria S. Wandrag, my supervisor, for her 
tireless and very helpful guidance throughout the process of writing this paper and the 
entire duration of this course. Her meticulous views and comments have made me a 
better writer. 
 
 I thank Professor Daniel D. Bradlow for sharing his very diverse knowledge on the 
subject, and for his helpful and objective guidance on the topic. It was at one of his 
lectures that I was stimulated to write on this topic. I am grateful to Dr. Edward Kwakwa 
for sharing his thoughtful insights on some of the issues canvassed in this paper. 
 
In the process of writing this paper, I have benefited from the tremendous help of many 
friends. I am deeply indebted to Ms. Philippa Moore and Ms. Catherine Schenker, who 
always found the time to review my earlier drafts and helped greatly me through very low 
moments in the course of writing. I sincerely appreciate and treasure the confidence they 
have in me. My debt is immense to Ms. Susan Kayonde for her tireless, very thoughtful 
and thorough comments on earlier drafts. I specially thank my dear friend Ms. Jacinta 
Anyinge, for her help throughout the course, on earlier drafts and in the process of 
writing this paper. I cannot easily express my eternal gratitude for her time, help, and 
support all the way. Even then, the ideas and any mistakes, grammatical or otherwise, 
remain mine. 
 
I am grateful to my parents, Drs Christopher and Rebecca Kirunda for the inspiration to 
aim higher in my academic pursuit and for the encouragement to excel as a budding 
scholar. I am only a mirror image of their zealous quest for knowledge. I am also deeply 
 
 
 
 
  5
thankful to my brother Solomon and my sisters Victoria and Joy Kirunda for their 
encouragement. I drew a lot of encouragement from my niece, Vanessa Xion Nakalungi, 
whose company I missed dearly but yet whose sweet voice from a far oft kept me going.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  6
ANCRONYMS 
IBRD    International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
IDA    International Development Agency 
IFC    International Finance Corporation 
MIGA    Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
UN    United Nations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  7
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Title Page          2 
Declaration          3 
Acknowledgements         4 
Acronyms          6 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction          9 
1.2 Statement of the problem       15  
1.3 Objective of the study        16 
1.4 Significance of the study       16 
1.5 Research Hypothesis        17 
1.6 Scope of the Study        17 
1.7 Methodology         18 
1.8 Structure of the Paper        18 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS ON 
POLITICAL PROHIBITION IN THE IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT  
2.0  Introduction         20 
2.1 Historical Account         21 
2.2 A Murky Maze of Interpretation      24 
2.3 To Amend or not to Amend: Which Way Forward?    35 
 
 
 
 
  8
2.4  Concluding Remarks        39 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE WORLD BANK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CHAD-CAMEROON 
PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE PROJECT: A BIRD’S EYE 
VIEW. 
3.0  Introduction         41 
3.1  The Project: Unprecedented Precedent     43 
3.1.1 Financing         43 
3.2 World Bank Involvement       44 
3.2.1 A Unique Revenue Management Plan     50 
3.3  Monitoring and Supervision        55 
3.4 Conclusion          56 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
4.1  Conclusion         58  
4.2  Recommendations: Towards a Comprehensive Approach   61  
 
Bibliography       
Books and Articles         66 
Reports          69 
International Documents         70 
f 
 
 
 
 
  9
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis.* 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION. 
 
Many an author have underscored the controversy surrounding the application and 
interpretation of the provisions that shackle the consideration of “political” issues in 
decision making in the World Bank Group (the Bank).1 Under its constituent charter 
known as the Articles of Agreement (the Articles), the Bank and its officers are 
prohibited from interfering in the political affairs of any of its members and being 
influenced in the making of their decisions by the political character of the member or 
members concerned. It is provided that only economic considerations should be relevant 
in the making of its decisions and these considerations should be weighed impartially in 
                                                 
*Old Latin maxim translating: The times are changing and we are changing with them. 
1 The World Bank Group comprises of the International Bank for Reconstruction and development (IBRD), 
International Development Agency (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC), Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency and the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). The term World Bank in this research will more generally allude to IBRD.  
 
Some of the scholars and authors that have written on this issue include: Yozo Yokota (1976): Non-
Political Charter of the World Bank, 20 Japanese An. Int’l L. 39, David Gillies, Human Rights, Democracy 
and “Good Governance:” Stretching The World Bank’s Policy Frontiers Montreal: International Centre for 
Human Rights and Democratic Development, 1994, D.D. Bradlow and C. Grossman (1996), Limited 
Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A new Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF Human Rights 
Quarterly 17.3 411-442, Caufield, C. (1998): Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of 
Nations (Houndmills: Macmillan), George, S. and Sabelli, F. (1994) Faith and Credit: The World Bank’s 
Secular Empire (London: Penguin), Payer, C. (1982) The World Bank: A Critical Analysis (New York: 
Monthly Review Press). Ibrahim Shihata (2000): The World Bank in a Changing World. Vol. 3 Kluwer 
Law International, Ciorciari, J.D. (2000): ‘The Lawful Scope of Human Rights Criteria in World Bank 
Credit Decisions: An Interpretive Analysis of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement. Cornell 
International Law Journal, vol.33 366, J Levinson (1998), Repressive Regimes Shouldn’t get a Loan,’ 
Washington Post, 15 June1998 at A23, M Darrow (2003), Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, 
the IMF and Human Rights Canan Gunduz (2004), Human Rights and Development: The World Bank’s 
Need for a Consistent Approach. LSE Working Paper Series Publication No. 04-49 ISSN 1470-2320 (on 
file with the author) Kapur Devesh, Lewis John P., Webb Richard (1997), The World Bank, its First Half 
Century. Vol. 1, the Brookings Institution ISBN 0-8157-5230-X (set) ISBN 0-8157-5234-2 (v.1) Ibrahim F. 
I. Shihata: The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and Record of 
Achievements. 17 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 39 1988-1989, Shihata (1991): The World Bank in a Changing 
World, Selected Essays Compiled by Franziska Tschofen and Antonio R. Para Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1991 Fergus Mackay (2002) Universal Rights or a Universe Unto Itsself? Indigenous People’s Rights and 
The World Bank’s Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indegenous Peoples AU Intl.L.Rev. 2002, Genoveva 
Hernandez Uriz (2001), To Lend or not To Lend: Oil, Human Rights and The World Bank’s Internal 
Contradictions. Harvard Human Rights Journal vol.14 spring 2001 ISSN 1057-5077 accessed at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/uriz/shtml visited on September 1st, 2006 
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order to achieve the Bank’s objectives.2 The Bank is further obliged to ensure that funds 
loaned will only be used for the purposes for which they were loaned, with due attention 
to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political 
considerations.3  
 
The Bank’s application and interpretation of the above articles has generated the 
controversy that underlies this research. This research paper points out the inconsistencies 
that underlie the Bank’s interpretation of the provisions of its Articles of Agreement that 
relate to political prohibition, and the Bank’s role in the protection of human rights in 
particular. This paper notes that human rights are political issues and to this extent, their 
consideration in making the Bank’s decisions is expressly prohibited. Even then, the 
Bank has on several occasions considered human rights issues in making its decisions, 
and this paper argues that the Bank should indeed do so. But in the past, this approach 
has presented problems as to whether it is rightfully within the mandate of the Bank to 
consider human rights in making its decisions.  
 
The need to reconcile the Bank’s mandate, its actions and perceptions, and develop a 
sound and concise approach to its role in the protection of human rights is what lies at the 
crux of this research paper. This paper takes account of the fact that over the years, there 
has been a significant shift in both the events and actions that influence the work of the 
Bank from the situation as it was when the Articles were drafted, and the impact that of 
the Bank’s work on human rights in the countries within which it operates. This research 
paper thus aims to suggest options for a coherent and credible way of including human 
rights in the mandate of the Bank – to the extent that they affect or their violation arises 
from – projects funded by the Bank. The paper will also show the limitations that 
surround the various options and as much as possible, make suggestions to overcome 
                                                 
2 See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, opened for 
signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S as amended Feb 19, 1989 Articles III section 5 (b), 
Article IV section 10 and Article V section 5(c). Similar provisions are found in the IDA Articles e.g. 
Articles I and IV Section 6. 
3IBRD Articles Article III Section 5 (b), IDA Articles Article V section 1(g) Although the World Bank 
Group comprises of five institutions, political prohibition provisions are contained in the Articles of only 
the International Bank For Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development 
Agency (IDA). 
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these limitations and hopefully, stimulate discussion of better ways of inculcating human 
rights into the Bank’s mandate. 
 
The relevance of these provisions at the time of drafting of the Articles has never been 
contested and will not be contested in this paper. Rather, a historical discourse will be 
undertaken in order to understand the context in which these provisions were intended to 
apply. While these provisions were drafted on well-intentioned premises, their current 
existence is questioned in light of the evolving role of the Bank in an ever-changing state 
of the world. If the Bank is to stay in line with the mandate for which it was established, 
it can no longer remain transfixed to its approach to political issues in the Articles as they 
were drafted in the post World War era. 
 
The provisions largely interrelate with and affect the way in which the Bank applies and 
interprets other provisions in its Articles, especially its mandate.4 The mandate of the 
Bank is set out in Article I of its charter and in essence was for the reconstruction of war 
torn Europe and the development of the poorer countries of the world.5 This mandate has 
largely evolved. A later emphasis on large-scale infrastructure projects and economic 
growth gave way to the broader paradigm of poverty alleviation. This was accompanied 
by the shift from projects to policy based lending. Structural adjustment loans took off in 
the mid-1980’s, and quickly evolved from macroeconomic policy reform to full-fledged 
reengineering of public sector policies and institutions. Such a broad excursion into 
arguably political domains without the adjustment of the provisions that prohibit the 
Bank from delving into political issues was justified with the need to create adequate 
                                                 
4 See e.g. G. Brodnig (2003), The World Bank and Human Rights: Mission Impossible? Carr Center for 
Human Rights Policy Working Paper T-01-05 at p.8 see also chapter two. 
5The at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, members agreed to create the IBRD (see note 1) to inter 
alia, finance the reconstruction of Europe and the IMF, to help with countries the problem of stabilizing 
balance of payments. These institutions have come to commonly be referred to as Bretton Woods 
institutions. The Bank’s history is summarized in chapter two but for the most comprehensive record of the 
history of the Bank was published by Kapur Devesh, Lewis John p., Webb Richard (1997), The World 
Bank, its First Half Century. Vol. 1, the Brookings institution 1997 ISBN 0-8157-5230-X (set) ISBN 0-
8157-5234-2 (v.1) but for a discussion of these provisions see also Mac Darrow (2003), Between Light and 
Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law Hart 
Publishing chapter 1 and the subsequent discussion on political prohibition at p. 150 and Shihata (1991): 
The World Bank in a Changing World, Selected Essays Compiled by Franziska Tschofen and Antonio R. 
Para Martinus Nijhoff Publishers chapter 2, pp.53-96, see also Shihata: The World Bank in a Changing 
World vol.3 chapter 5, pp155-186, e.g. at p.168 
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“enabling environments” for economic growth and development and make reform 
“politically viable.”6 
 
At various stages in the past years of its existence, the Bank has come up with different 
operational procedures, and initiatives such as the “safeguard policies” (which deal with 
environmental, social and legal implications of the Bank’s operations),7 the infamous 
structural adjustment programs8 the Comprehensive Development Framework9 and more 
recently the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC).10 Each of these measures 
was undertaken to fit the Bank’s work in the newly defined mandate of development 
through poverty alleviation and to enhance that mandate.  
 
Over time, the nexus between the Bank’s mandate and human rights has come of age.11 
Together with this has come the conceptualization of the right to development.12 The 
                                                 
6 G. Brodnig (2003), The World Bank and Human Rights: Mission Impossible? Carr Center for Human 
Rights Policy Working Paper T-01-05 at p.4 
7 ibid at P.5. 
8For a discussion of the meaning of Structural Adjustment Programs, their history and effect on human 
rights and development, See Sigrun I. Skogly (1993), Structural Adjustment and Development: Human 
Rights--An Agenda for Change Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4. (Nov., 1993), pp. 751-778. See 
also Lena Adu-Kofi: The Impact Of The International Monetary Fund And The World Bank Structural 
Adjustment Programs On Sub-Saharan African Women New England International And Comparative Law 
Annual [Vol. 4 1998] Pp.73-107 Especially At Pp. 82-85. More generally also see Caufield, C. (1998): 
Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations (Houndmills: Macmillan), and Mallaby 
(2004): The World’s Banker Penguin Books pp. 380-385. 
9 For A Discussion On The Comprehensive Development Framework, its history and how it got inculcated 
into the Bank’s work see Shihata: The World Bank In A Changing World Vol.3 Chapter 5, Pp109-111 And 
Mallaby (2004): The World’s Banker Penguin Books Chapter 8, Pp. 207-231. 
10 For this and more examples see paragraph 21, notes 51-58 and accompanying text of Oloka-Onyango 
and Deepika Udagama: The Realization Of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: Globalization and its 
impact on the full enjoyment of human rights Preliminary report submitted in accordance with Sub-
Commission resolution 1999/8 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 15 June 2000. Accessed on April 2, 2007 and is 
available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2000.13.En?Opendocument 
11For an analysis of the nexus between Human Rights and development see for example the work of 
Amartya Sen: Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford University Press 
1981, Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishers 1985, more recently Development as 
Freedom New York: Anchor Books 1990. See also his Choice, Welfare and Measurement Oxford, 
Blackwell 1992 and Resources, Value and Development. Harvard University Press, 1984. See also 
Dominic McGoldrick (1996), Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An Intergrated Conception” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 45. 
12 United Nations Declaration of the Right to Development was adopted in 1986 by General Assembly 
Resolution 41/128 of December 4, 1986 available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm see also 
Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality. Harvard Human Rights 
Journal vol.17 pp. 137-168 at pp.137-140. 
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Bank has indeed recognized these developments and even devoted resources to analyzing 
how human rights impact on its projects and detailing its “record of achievement” on 
human rights.13 As Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama observe: “In the field of 
human rights, the Bank followed UNDP by issuing a set of guidelines linking its 
activities to what it perceived as its human rights obligations.14 While the guidelines do 
indicate that the Bank is thinking about the issue, clearly it needs to do much more.”15 
The report they refer to is World Bank (1998), Development and Human Rights: The 
Role of the World Bank.16 But this report is more of a record of the World Bank’s work 
in the human rights dimension than a set of guidelines.  
 
In the recent years, the World Bank has increasingly moved towards integrating human 
rights within its work. This has involved having its work focus on the environmental 
impact of its projects, the need for social assessments, the protection of cultural property, 
good governance, indigenous people, and several other dimensions in the human rights 
arena.17 Consequently, the Bank has always taken measures to ensure that human rights 
are fully respected in connection with the projects it supports but it has been less 
forthcoming about articulating its role in promoting human rights within the countries in 
                                                 
13 World Bank (1998), Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank ISBN 0-8213-4340-
8. On the World bank’s work on the empirical relationship between Human Rights and Governance and the 
Work of the World bank, see Daniel Kaufmann (2005), Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical 
Challenge, World Bank Institute. Further for a general discussion and analysis on Human Rights and 
Development, see Klaus Decker, Siobhan McInerney-Lankford and Caroline Sage: Human Rights and 
Equitable Development. Working Paper on file with the Author. See also Genoveva Hernandez Uriz 
(2001), To Lend or not To Lend: Oil, Human Rights and The World Bank’s Internal Contradictions. 
Harvard Human Rights Journal vol.14 spring 2001 ISSN 1057-5077 accessed at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/uriz/shtml visited on September 1st, 2006 
14 The report they refer to is World Bank (1998), Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World 
Bank ISBN 0-8213-4340-8. But in the author’s view, this report is more of a record of the World Bank’s 
work in the human rights dimension than a set of guidelines. 
15 Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama: The Realization Of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: 
Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights Preliminary report submittedin 
accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 1999/8 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 15 June 2000. Accessed on 
April 2, 2007 and is available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2000.13.En?Opendocument  
16 op.cit note 12, World Bank (1998) 
17 Gernot Brodnig The world Bank and Human Rigts: Mission Impossible? Carr Center for Human Rights 
Working Paper T-01-05 at p.9, I.F.I. Shihata: The World Bank and Human Rights: An analysis of the Legal 
Issues and Record of Achievements. 17 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Policy 39-66. See also Shihata, Human Rights, 
Development and International Financial Institutions. Vol.8 Am.U.J. Int’l L &Policy 27 1992-1993. Pp. 27-
37. 
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which it operates let alone including them in its mandate.18 Although the Bank’s 
pronouncements on human rights have always been broadly supportive, they have never 
affirmed in concrete terms that the Bank has a specific role to play in relation to human 
rights as legal principles, or as legal obligations.19 
 
There is now cause to believe that what is not clear within the Bank is exactly how to 
formally inculcate human rights in its development mandate.20 One school of thought has 
it that human rights have always been part of the Bank’s mandate21 and another that 
human rights have become part of the Bank’s mandate over the years as a result of its 
subsequent practice and the evolving notion of development.22 But the purposefully 
narrow and strict wording of these provisions as seen in the context of their history and 
the manner in which the provisions have been interpreted suggests otherwise.23 This 
research paper thus evaluates these interpretations in a bid to reconcile them with the 
Bank’s mandate as set out in its Articles in juxtaposition to the Bank’s role in protecting 
human rights. 
 
As a case study, the paper analyzes the Bank’s role in the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum 
Development and Oil Pipeline project (the project) in which the Bank has been involved 
since the year 2000. The paper presents the lessons, challenges and implications from this 
                                                 
18 World Bank, The Inspection Panel, Investigation Report: Chad-Cameroon Petroleum and Pipeline 
Project (Loan No. 4558-CD); Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project (Credit No.3373-
CD); and Management of the Petroleum Economy (Credit No. 3316-CD) at p. 62 
19 See Ana Palacio (Present General Counsel of the World Bank) (2006), The Way Forward: Human Rights 
and the World Bank Article on the World Bank Development Outreach, World Bank Institute, October 
2006 available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/0,,contentMDK:21106614
~menuPK:445640~pagePK:64020865~piPK:149114~theSitePK:445634,00.html accessed on 27/02/2007 
20 ibid 
21 See for instance Canan Gunduz (2004), Human Rights and Development: The World Bank’s Need for a 
Consistent Approach. LSE Working Paper Series Publication No. 04-49 ISSN 1470-2320 (on file with the 
author) 
22 op.cit Brodnig at note 17, see pp.9-13 According to Brodnig, “A strong argument can be made that the 
Bank’s Articles of Agreement permit the consideration of human rights issues, as long as such policies and 
practices do not violate the (considerably narrowed) political activity prohibition of Article IV/10. The 
evolving notion of what constitutes development together with the Bank’s past practice of integrating non-
economic issues into its work suggest that there are no major legal obstacles to adopting a rights-based 
approach to development.” 
23 See chapter two. And see also Ibrahim Shihata (2000): The World Bank in a Changing World. Vol. 3 
Kluwer Law International, at p.155 
 
 
 
 
  15
project with regard to the Bank’s approach to and future involvement in promoting the 
protection of human rights. The project, which at the time of its commencement was the 
largest single investment in Africa, was for the transportation of oil from the landlocked 
southern Chad to the Atlantic coast of Cameroon for export.24 The developments 
throughout the construction process and different measures undertaken to ensure the 
success of this project demonstrate the interrelatedness of human rights concerns to the 
Bank’s mandate and therefore how important it is to include human rights therein.  
 
Given Chad’s political history and record of human rights violations,25 and against the 
background of tensions that surrounded the project prior to the World Bank’s 
involvement, it is important to understand what factors the Bank considered in order to 
determine whether to get involved in the project or not. The paper also analyzes the 
unique structures adopted by the Bank in this project against the central question of the 
Bank’s role in the protection of human rights.  
 
This paper has the twin purposes of resolving the apparent contradiction in the 
application and interpretation of the provisions on political prohibition in the Bank’s 
Articles and analyzing the Bank’s role in the protection of human rights. By considering 
the Bank’s own interpretation of these provisions and looking at the Chad-Cameroon 
project as an example of Bank’s reaction to the interface of human rights with its work, 
the paper raises a variety of questions and makes suggestions that are aimed at presenting 
a clearer approach to the attendant issues. 
 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. 
The Articles on political prohibition in the Bank’s decision making have long since 
outlived their usefulness. The situation has not been helped by the interpretations offered 
by the Bank’s General Counsel or its inconsistent practice. The Bank has continued to 
                                                 
24For a  general description of the project see chapter 3 and Donald R. Norland: Innovations of the 
Chad/Cameroon Pipeline Project: Thinking outside the Box Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2003 pp.46-
59 Ian Gary, Nikki Reisch  (2005), Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s 
Newest Petro-State  
25 Amnesty International, Contracting Outside Human Rights: The Chad Cameroon Project ISBN 1873328 
62 1 at pp. 15, 17, 34-40 
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rely on these provisions to justify its recusal from crucial obligations and activities that 
are central to realizing its mandate, particularly in the area of human rights. Political 
considerations so far as they relate to or their violation arises from projects funded by the 
Bank cannot be divorced from economic factors or the realization of the Bank’s mandate. 
This is buttressed by the complex and turbulent histories and prevalent social and 
economic problems in its poor members such as Chad that desperately need the Bank’s 
funding and technical assistance.  
 
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY. 
The main objective of this research paper is to suggest a comprehensive approach that the 
World Bank can use in dealing with human rights. The paper points out the 
inconsistencies that underlie the Bank’s interpretation of the provisions of its Articles of 
Agreement that relate to political prohibition. The need to reconcile the mandate of the 
Bank, its actions and perceptions and develop a sound and concise approach to its role in 
the protection of human rights is what lies at the crux of this research paper. The research 
paper delves into an analysis of these provisions against the backdrop of their history and 
shows that they have outlived their usefulness. The paper balances the historical 
justification for these provisions with recent development to expose the inherent conflict 
between the Bank’s work today and its mandate. In so doing, the paper aims to show that 
human rights are political factors that are excluded from the mandate of the Bank by the 
wording of the aforesaid provisions but that their protection is central to the realization of 
the full benefits of World Bank funded projects and as such, central to its mandate.  
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY. 
The importance of the current research is premised in the tremendous shift both of events 
and actions that influence the work of the Bank from the situation as it was when the 
Articles were drafted and the impact that the Bank’s work has on human rights in the 
countries in which it operates. This research paper will suggest options for a coherent and 
credible way of including political considerations, and human rights in particular, in the 
mandate of the Bank – to the extent that they affect or their violation arises from – 
projects funded by the Bank. The paper will also show the limitations that surround the 
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various options and as much as possible, make suggestions to overcome these limitations 
and stimulate discussion of better ways of inculcating human rights into the Bank’s 
mandate. This paper captures the latest developments and literature on the topic, hence 
presenting fresh justifications for the arguments it sets forth. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
It serves the Bank better to amend or at least attempt to amend its Articles to eliminate 
the provisions on political prohibition or to enlarge them to cater for the protection of 
human rights as part of its mandate. This will allow the Bank to undertake ventures and 
resort to measures that it has hitherto declined to undertake even though they closely 
relate to or influence the outcome of its projects without violating its mandate or 
contradicting itself when it takes pro-human rights measures. But this in itself is not 
enough, neither is it without limitations. Therefore, the World Bank now needs a 
comprehensive and more effective and embracing approach to human rights and how 
they affect its projects. 
 
1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY. 
This research paper is intended to focus on specific provisions of the Bank’s Articles. 
While other provisions will be referred to, the research is focused on Article IV section 
10 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement, which provides: 
“Political Activity Prohibited 
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; 
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the 
member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to 
their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to 
achieve the purposes stated in Article I.”26 
 
 Broad as the range of “political” issues attributable to this discussion is, this paper 
                                                 
26 Article IV section 10, Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S as amended Feb 19, 1989 
available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049603~pagePK:439
12~piPK:36602,00.html#I11  
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concentrates on human rights, albeit with limited reference to other issues such as the 
environment. In its analysis and discussion on the promotion of human rights, however, 
the paper does not advocate for the Bank to get involved in the enforcement of human 
rights for that would clearly distort the raison d etre, of the Bank’s existence let alone 
result into an overlap with other agencies of the United Nations (UN). The scope of this 
paper is further limited in drawing most of its illustrations from events in Chad that 
directly relate to the Bank’s involvement in the Chad-Cameroon Project, although some 
other illustrations are used and the general state of human rights violations in Chad prior 
to the commencement of the project is taken note of. 
 
1.7 METHODOLOGY. 
This research is descriptive and analytical in nature and the handling of data is 
qualitative. The primary mode that was used was desk research. The research comprised 
of a comprehensive analysis of existing literature on the subject and the factual events in 
the case study. The literature relevant to this study included both primary and secondary 
sources of literature. The primary sources, though not many, included international legal 
instruments mainly treaties and international documents and reports. The secondary 
sources included textbooks, academic and scholarly journal articles, reports, online 
publications and other source available which were relevant to the research. This analysis 
was also supplemented by discussions with a few eminent scholars on the subject and its 
attendant issues.  
 
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER. 
 This paper is divided into four chapters. This chapter commences by introducing the 
subject of the research. It then sets out the statement of the problem, the main objective 
and significance of the study. The chapter also includes the hypothesis and research 
methodology and ends by setting out the structure of the rest of the paper. 
 
Chapter two discusses the provisions on political prohibition. Drawing from the historical 
background of these provisions, the chapter delves into an analysis of the Bank’s 
understanding and application of these provisions over the years and how this has 
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evolved and balances this approach against the relationship between human rights, the 
Bank and its mandate. In this process, the chapter shows the shortcomings of the Bank’s 
current approach and suggests some ways of adjusting the Bank’s apolitical mandate. 
There are limitations to this, however, and this chapter points them out and makes 
suggestions thereto. 
 
Chapter three considers the Chad-Cameroon Project as a case study. It illustrates the 
magnitude to which projects in which the Bank is involved can result into or exacerbate 
human rights violations. The chapter takes note of how creative the Bank was in 
designing unique aspects in this project and vouches for a similar approach in future 
projects. 
 
Chapter four contains the conclusions and recommendations. It is argued on the whole 
that the Articles should be amended but that this is not without limitation. The limitations 
to this approach are also considered and alternatives are suggested. It is also noted that 
amending the articles is not enough and additional suggestions towards a practical 
approach to the inclusion of human rights in the mandate of the Bank are made.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS ON 
POLITICAL PROHIBITION IN THE IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT. 
 
“The law like the traveler must always be ready for the morrow. It must have a 
principle of growth”♣ 
 
Some have agreeably argued that it is now well established that the World Bank is not a 
politically neutral institution, concerned solely with matters of efficiency and economic 
growth and that in various ways, the World Bank has been engaged in an endeavor to 
bring political concepts into its development strategies.27 Indeed, World Bank documents 
such as Country Assistance Strategies (CASs), World Development Reports (WDRs) and 
other Bank publications increasingly include political statements, or pass political 
judgments on situations in borrowing countries. In their attempt to carry out the ever-
increasing tasks requested of them, Bank members of staff often find it relevant or useful 
to take certain political considerations into account. At times, they are blamed when they 
fail to do so.28  
 
The text of the Bank’s Articles does, however, explicitly state that the staff may not take 
such considerations into account in making their decisions.29 This chapter sets out to 
investigate whether such consideration is valid and whether the provisions on political 
prohibition have become an atavistic anomaly to the Bank’s work. Three sets of 
provisions are relevant to the subject matter of this discussion and they include: 
                                                 
♣ Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, U.S. Supreme Court. As adapted from Dennis Lloyd, The Idea of Law. 
Penguin Books, 1970 (Reprint). 
27 Graham Harrison (2005): The World Bank, Governance and Theories of Political Action in Africa, 
BJPIR: Vol. 7, 240–260 at p.1. See also Caufield, C. (1998): Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the 
Poverty of Nations (Houndmills: Macmillan), George, S. and Sabelli, F. (1994) Faith and Credit: The 
World Bank’s Secular Empire (London: Penguin), Payer, C. (1982) The World Bank: A Critical Analysis 
(New York: Monthly Review Press). See also notes 13 and 14 in chapter one and accompanying text. 
28 Ibrahim Shihata: The World Bank in a Changing World. Vol. 3 Kluwer Law International, 2000 at p.155 
29 ibid 
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(a) the provisions that state the Bank’s mandate and which limit the Bank’s financing 
to specific projects except in certain circumstances. These provisions are set out 
in Articles I and III section 4(vii);  
(b) those that deal explicitly with political considerations. These are set out in Article 
III section 5 (b), Article IV section 10 and Article V section 5(c); and  
(c) those which deal with interpretation and amendment of the articles.  
These provisions are purposefully narrow. The Authors of the drafts of the Articles of 
Agreement were cognizant, of course, of the interaction between politics and economics 
and the difficulty of insulating an inter-governmental institution from political 
considerations. Rather than weakening their resolve, such cognizance prompted them to 
emphasize the need to allow the Bank to operate as a universal, financial institution, 
which “shall scrupulously avoid interference in the political affairs of any member” and 
would act “in strict impartiality.”30  
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. Commencing with a historical perspective of the 
Bank’s operation and the evolution of the political prohibitions debate, the chapter 
proceeds to evaluate the interpretations of the aforesaid provisions as have been handed 
down from the Bank’s General Counsel. The focus here is confined to offering an 
exegesis of the interpretations of the Bank’s General Counsel, in light of the World 
Bank’s approach in dealing with human rights. The third part of this chapter considers the 
way forward and addresses the issue of whether or not to amend the Bank’s Articles. The 
final part presents conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2.1 Historical Account. 
Three principal reasons are given for the drafting of the political prohibition clauses.  
Firstly, in the global political context of the emerging Cold War, the architects of the 
Bretton Woods system, notably Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes believed 
that it was essential to design the Bank as a technocratic institution isolated from political 
                                                 
30 Ibrahim Shihata (2000): The World Bank in a Changing World. Vol. 3 Kluwer Law International, 2000 
at p.165 
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considerations.31  This, it was hoped, would attract members regardless of their political 
ideology, in particular the Soviet Union.32  There was a slightly more complex need to 
take account of the “tripolar ideological tensions” between communist Russia, socialist 
Britain and Capitalist America.33 Secondly, Britain’s strategic concern to insulate itself 
against American economic dominance or anti-commonwealth bias.  Thirdly, it is 
believed that the drafters simply wanted to ensure the efficient functioning of the Bank.34 
This in their view required a purely technical and economic method for resource 
allocation.  While no single cause can be set forth for the drafting of these provisions, it is 
plausible to state that these provisions find their genesis in a combination of the above 
factors.35 
 
Despite the caution that was reflected in these provisions, political factors have been at 
the centre of World Bank activity, often coinciding with “creditworthiness” almost 
through its entire time of existence. In the Bank’s early years, political considerations 
manifested mostly through the importance of political ties between the United States (the 
Bank’s largest share holder) and other borrowing members.36 In 1950, A Bank mission 
visited Ethiopia, for instance, targeted as an African client state by the United States. The 
mission found a wretchedly poor country governed by an autocrat, a public 
administration with virtually no technical capacity or authority to formulate or execute 
public works and public service damaged severely by war and administrative neglect. 
                                                 
31ibid  
32 E Mason and R Asher (1973), The World Bank Since Bretton Woods at 27. 
33 Ciorciari, J.D. (2000): ‘The Lawful Scope of Human Rights Criteria in World Bank Credit Decisions: An 
Interpretive Analysis of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement, Cornell International Law Journal, 
vol.33 366, see also J Levinson, Repressive Regimes Shouldn’t get a Loan,’ Washington Post, 15 June1998 
at A23, M Darrow (2003), Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the IMF and Human Rights, p. 
169  
34ibid Ciorciari, J.D. (2000) 
35 ibid Ciorciari, J.D. (2000), see also Canan Gunduz (2004), Human Rights and Development: The World 
Bank’s Need for a Consistent Approach. LSE Working Paper Series Publication No. 04-49 ISSN 1470-
2320 (on file with the author) at p.14 see also Mac Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, 
the IMF and International Human Rights Law at pp. 168-169. 
36 Kapur Devesh, Lewis John P., Webb Richard, The World Bank, its First Half Century. Vol. 1, the 
Brookings institution 1997 ISBN 0-8157-5230-X (set) ISBN 0-8157-5234-2 (v.1) pp. 101-103. For a 
discussion on US influence in the World Bank see also Lena Adu-Kofi (1998), The Impact Of The 
International Monetary Fund And The World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs On Sub-Saharan 
African Women New England International And Comparative Law Annual (Vol. 4) Pp.73-107 Especially 
At Pp. 77-80. 
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That notwithstanding, three loans were arranged and approved without much preparation, 
the first being approved in 1951, “otherwise nothing would happen.” 37 
 
One of the Bank’s largest developing country borrowers in terms of the number of loans 
was Nicaragua, a nation with one million inhabitants. Between 1951 and 1956, Nicaragua 
received nine World Bank loans, and one in 1960, owing to its political ties with the 
United States.38 Guatemala, with three times the population of Nicaragua, was one of the 
first countries to receive a survey mission (published in 1951) but did not obtain a loan 
until 1955, as it was still under a communist regime disfavored by the United States.39  
 
The most vivid illustration that brings to the fore the debate on the political prohibition 
provisions is the controversy that surrounded the loan applications made by South Africa 
and Portugal in the 1960s. In December 1965, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted two resolutions prohibiting the Bank from giving financial assistance to these 
countries because of their respective apartheid and colonial policies.40 In the controversy 
that ensued, both the Bank and the United Nations raised various legal arguments about 
the scope of the Bank’s undertakings under its relationship agreement with the United 
Nations and the limitations imposed by the Bank’s Articles of Agreement.41 
 
The Bank argued inter alia, that it would be improper to accept the recommendations of 
the United Nations General Assembly in the cases involved because of the political 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Kapur Devesh, Lewis John p., Webb Richard, The World Bank, its First Half Century. Vol. 1, the 
Brookings institution 1997 ISBN 0-8157-5230-X (set) ISBN 0-8157-5234-2 (v.1) pp. 101-103 
39 Kapur Devesh, Lewis John p., Webb Richard, The World Bank, its First Half Century. Vol. 1, the 
Brookings institution 1997 ISBN 0-8157-5230-X (set) ISBN 0-8157-5234-2 (v.1) pp. 101-103 
40 ‘The Policies of the Apartheid Government of the Republic of South Africa’ GA Res 2054 A (XX), 20 
UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 16, UN Doc. A/6014 (1966); Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries’ People,’ GA Res 2105 (XX), 20 UN GAOR, Supp. 
(No.14) 16 UN Doc. A/6014 (1966) and 2107 (XX) of 15, 20 and 21 December 1965, See also Ibrahim F. 
I. Shihata: The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and Record of 
Achievements. 17 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 39 1988-1989 pp.39-66 at p.43 
41 This controversy in its entirety and all the attendant documents and UN Resolutions are captured in the 
report of the UN Secretary General titled: The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa. Question of Territories Under Portuguese Administration. Consultation with the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. UNGA 22nd Session Doc. No. A/6825 15 September 1967. For 
a very good analysis of this controversy see Samuel A. Bleicher, UN v. IBRD International Organizations 
Vol. 24, No. 1. (Winter, 1970), pp.31-47 (on file with the author). 
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prohibition contained in Article IV, section 10 of its Articles of Agreement. In both cases 
(South Africa and Portugal), the Bank maintained its position that it was prohibited by its 
articles from interfering in the political affairs of its members. The Bank recognized, 
however, that on some occasions it does take into consideration, and is influenced in its 
lending decisions, by the economic effects, which stem from the political character of a 
member and from the censures and condemnations of that member by the United Nations 
organs.42  
 
2.2 A Murky Maze of Interpretations: 
The Articles of Agreement are a treaty to which the members are bound. Their 
interpretation is largely based on the approach in the Vienna Conventions on the Law of 
Treaties and the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or 
Between International Organizations.43 The approach espoused in the Vienna 
Conventions is furthered by the requirement that interpretation of the Bank’s Articles 
must be based on the purposes stated in Article I of the text of its articles.44   
 
The IBRD Articles have been subject to frequent interpretations, formal and informal, 
explicit and implied, from within and outside of the Bank.45 Whenever clarification of the 
Articles’ requirements has been needed within the Bank, its Executive Directors have 
discussed it in light of a legal opinion by the General Counsel. Such an opinion does not 
amount to an authoritative interpretation of the Articles, as the power to make such an 
interpretation is vested in the Board of Executive Directors.46 However, the Board’s 
endorsement of, or concurrence with, the General Counsel’s opinions allows for their 
incorporation in the Bank’s subsequent practice. While this informal approach maintains 
a large measure of flexibility for the Board, it also enhances the value of the General 
                                                 
42 ibid. Shihata at p.44. See also Memorandum of the Legal Department of the IBRD, 22 U.N. GAOR 
Annex II at 9, U.N. Doc A/6825 (1967). 
43 Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties 1969 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/11/Add.2, Articles 31 to 33 as 
repeated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations 
1986 U.N. Doc A/Conf 129/15. See also Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World. Vol. 3 Kluwer 
Law International, 2000 at p.6 
44 ibid Shihata at p. 17, see also Article 1 and Article IX of the IBRD Articles of Agreement. 
45 ibid 
46 ibid 
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Counsel’s legal opinions as a source of the Bank’s law. At least since 1983, there has 
been no case where the Board disagreed with the conclusions of these opinions.47 To 
date, there have been at least five interpretations on the question of political prohibition.48 
 
Each of these interpretations presents different lessons. In the first interpretation that was 
offered in the wake of the South Africa and Portugal controversy discussed earlier, the 
IBRD General Counsel propounded that the political prohibition in the Bank’s Articles 
had two purposes. Firstly, to prevent the possibility of using Bank financing as leverage 
against any Bank member in order to advance the political aims of any other member or 
group of members. Secondly, to assure private capital markets that economic, rather than 
political considerations, would guide the Bank’s financial decisions.49 This view is 
probably the closest, of all other views expressed in later interpretations, to what are the 
known historical reasons why the political prohibition provisions were included at the 
time when the Articles were drafted as has been discussed above.50 
 
 In disagreeing with this opinion, the United Nations Legal Counsel opined that Article 
IV section 10 “would appear to have as its purpose the prohibition of interference in the 
internal political affairs of a member state and of discrimination against a state because of 
the political character of its government,”51 a view that is also traceable in later 
interpretations offered by Ibrahim Shihata as General Counsel of the Bank.52 The first 
                                                 
47 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World. Vol. 3 Kluwer Law International, 2000 at 
p.6, 16-17 
48 Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of The World Bank Senior Vice President And General 
Counsel. January 27, 2006; Prohibition of Political Activities in the World Bank’s work, Legal Opinion of 
the Senior Vice President and general Counsel, dated July 12, 1995; Issues of “Governance” in Borrowing 
Members – The extent of their relevance Under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, legal Memorandum of 
the General Counsel dated December 21st, 1990; and Political activities under the IBRD Articles of 
Agreement and its Relevance to the Work of the Executive Directors, Legal opinion of the General 
Counsel, dated  December 23, 1987. Memorandum of the Legal Department of the IBRD 22 U.N. GAOR 
Annex II at 9, U.N. Doc A/6825 (1967). 
49 Mac Darrow (2003): Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the IMF and International Human 
Rights Law at p. 151. See also D. Bradlow (1996): The World Bank, the IMF and Human Rights 6 
Transnational Law and Contemporary problems 47-90 at p.55 
50 See also Mac Darrow (ibid) note 184 at p.151 
51 21 U.N. GAOR 4-20, U.N. Doc. A/C.4 SR 1653 (prov. Ed.1966) reprinted in (1967) 6 International Law 
Materials 171, 172, cited in Mac Darrow (2003). 
52 Shihata (1991): The World Bank in a Changing World, Selected Essays Compiled by Franziska Tschofen 
and Antonio R. Para Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991 chapter 2, pp.53-96, see also Shihata: The world 
Bank in a Changing World vol.3 chapter 5, pp155-186, e.g. at p.168 
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opinion thus did not only serve to refresh the historical account of these provisions but 
also set the pace for the interpretations that would follow. This first legal interpretation 
also teaches the important lesson that some countries with poor human rights records 
(such as the existence of apartheid policies in South Africa) may also have sound 
economic policies pursuant to which the Bank can safely invest in those countries. 
 
From three interpretations subsequent to the one discussed above, all issued by Ibrahim 
Shihata as then General Counsel of the Bank, a refined test has been developed by the 
Bank in addressing the controversy of political prohibition and applied as a yardstick for 
the making of its decisions. In his approach, Shihata creatively “stretched” the Bank’s 
mandate to include attention to certain human rights and popular participation,53 but 
without “distorting” its articles or conceding that all human rights should be considered. 
In his view, “while the purposes of the Bank are exhaustively stated, the functions which 
allow the Bank to serve such purposes may be expanded as deemed necessary or 
desirable.”54  
 
In an attempt to distinguish between “economic” and “political” factors, Shihata defined 
an  “economic factor” within the meaning of the Bank’s Articles as any factor that has a 
direct and obvious economic effect relevant to the Bank’s work. He then defined the term 
“political” as going to the art and practice of running a country or governing it. In his 
view, political factors would include those that would require the Bank to take a side in 
the political system of its Borrower states, such as favoring one political system over 
another.55  
 
His suggested definition of “political” factors also includes “considerations which might 
result in the Bank’s decisions being influenced by the decisions, opinions, or beliefs of 
the people or the parties holding power in member states” but “should exclude for 
                                                 
53 Popular participation here generally refers to wide consultation with stakeholders and the affected 
peoples in the areas where the project is to be built. It is now part of the World Bank’s Operation Directive 
principles as O.D 4.01 and must as such be sought and acted upon. See further discussion in chapter 3. 
54 Shihata (1991): The World Bank in a Changing World, Selected Essays Compiled by Franziska Tschofen 
and Antonio R. Para Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991 chapter 2, pp.53-96 See also Mac Darrow (2003): 
The World Bank, the IMF and Human Rights at p.153  
55 ibid 
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practical purposes of the Bank’s Articles, such typical economic and technical issues, as 
the management of money or finances, or more generally, the management of a country’s 
resources.”56 Thus in his view, what is important for the Bank is to limit itself to the 
necessary analysis needed for the purposes of its work and not interfere or take sides in 
the direction of the political events or factors in place and to limit itself to the direct and 
obvious economic effects relevant to its work. Further, that the case for a direct and 
obvious economic effect has to be established in a clear and unequivocal manner based 
on an objective analysis.57 To conduct the objective analysis, Shihata set out a tripartite 
test to determine whether the economic effect of a particular factor in a Bank’s operation 
is “direct and obvious.” The economic effect must be:  
(1) “clear and unequivocal;  
(2) preponderant; and 
(3) when the issue is associated with political actions or events, the economic effect 
must be of such an impact and relevance to make it a Bank concern.”58 
 
Shihata’s approach (which can largely be referred to as the Bank’s approach) raises 
several concerns. First, it reveals the ambiguity of the terms “political” and “economic,” 
and lends itself to being interpreted or manipulated in multiple and even contradictory 
manners. To this extent, continued interpretation of the Articles has only resulted into an 
incoherent approach to human rights.59 Consequently, divergent views have arisen from 
both the Bank’s staff and practice on the one hand and the plethora of literature outside 
the Bank on the other hand, devoted to settling this question.60 This shows how important 
                                                 
56 ibid Shihata at pp. 70-71, Mac Darrow at p.154 see also D. Bradlow (1996): The World Bank, the IMF 
and Human Rights 6 Transnational Law and Contemporary problems 47-90 at p.60 
57 Ibrahim Shihata (2000): The World Bank in a Changing World. Vol. 3 Kluwer Law International, at 
p.168 
58 Shihata (1991): The World Bank in a Changing World, Selected Essays Compiled by Franziska Tschofen 
and Antonio R. Para Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991 chapter 2, pp.53-96 See also Mac Darrow (2003): 
The World Bank, the IMF and Human Rights at p.154, see also D. Bradlow (1996): The World Bank, the 
IMF and Human Rights 6 Transnational Law and Contemporary problems 47-90 at p.60 
59 D.D. Bradlow and C. Gorossman (1996), Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: The A new 
Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF Human Rights Quarterly 17.3 411-442 at p.430-432  
60 For some of the literature that is alluded to here, see note 1 of Chapter 1. The divergent views are 
explored ahead in the part that deals with whether to amend or not to amend the Articles of Agreement but 
see also Business Day September 22 1998 Blair Calls for Urgent Reform of the IMF, World Bank at p.1, 
see also J. Verspaget, Report on the Activities of the Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank and IMF) 
Eur. Parl. Ass. Doc No. 7256 1995, further see Markay (2002), Universal Rights or a Universe Unto Itself? 
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it would have been for the drafters to state what they intended to mean in the use of the 
terms “political” and “economic” considerations.  
 
Secondly, when the General Counsel stated that when an issue is associated with political 
actions or events, the economic effect must be of such an impact and relevance to make it 
a Bank concern, he did not state any clear standard to be applied in such circumstances. 
This gives the Directors and subsequent Legal Counsel a lot of room in which to interpret 
these provisions. In effect, this test did not dissolve the ambiguity it was intended to 
address.  
 
Thirdly, as chapter three will show, attempting to divest typical economic and technical 
issues such as the management of money or finances, or more generally, the management 
of a country’s resources from the Bank’s decision making, presents its own difficulties. 
These factors are pivotal in the Bank’s decision making if it is to ensure proper utilization 
of its funding and the maximization of the proceeds resulting therefrom for the alleviation 
of poverty.61 In some cases, as with the Chadian government, the Bank may often have to 
literally instruct Borrower members on how its loans and the proceeds from World Bank 
funded projects are to be spent. Arguably, this may not have been envisioned at the 
Bank’s inception, but as a development institution bent on alleviating poverty in its 
member countries, its work remains the only hope for a better quality of life for many a 
poor country and people around the world.  
 
Also, popular participation, if desired or sought by the Bank, raises parallel obligations 
on the Bank’s part. First, that such participation will not be treated with secrecy (as was 
the case with the Narmada Dam project in India)62 but fully published in order to harness 
transparency on the part of the Bank. Secondly, that the Bank should be willing to deal 
                                                                                                                                                 
Indigenous People’s Rights and The World Bank’s Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples 
AU Intl. L .Rev. 2002 at p.529-532 
61 The Bank’s mandate is said to have evolved from just reconstruction and development to poverty 
alleviation. See Shihata (2000): The World Bank in a Changing World vol.3 pp.158-159 and related cited 
works. See also Danino (2006): Legal Opinion On Human Rights And The Work Of The World Bank 
Senior Vice President And General Counsel. January 27, 2006 pages 1-3 
62 See Catherine Caufield (1996), Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations, chapter 
one pp 5-29 
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with the issues that will arise from such participation, whether political in their nature or 
not. Such participation cannot be invited in the expectation that it will only raise 
economic considerations, and so ignoring its results negates the purpose of having sought 
it in the first place. Also, persons offering information to the Bank may in some cases 
expose themselves to risks in the process, while others that desire to offer information to 
the Bank may decline for fear of persecution. As a result, the Bank needs to have clear 
and well-publicized ways and mechanisms of soliciting information and ensuring the 
safety of its informants for example, by securing the necessary assurances from the 
Borrowing government that it will do whatever is necessary to ensure that such people 
feel safe. 
 
With regard to human rights, the Bank has taken a view explicit in Shihata’s approach 
that civil and political rights fall outside the purview of the Bank’s political mandate, but 
that it is within its mandate to consider economic, social and cultural rights. Shihata also 
did note that political events, which have a bearing on economic conditions of a member 
or on the member’s ability to implement a project or the Bank’s ability to supervise the 
project, might be taken into consideration.63 He further stated that:  
 
“While these conclusions clearly indicate that, as a general principle, the Bank 
and its Executive Directors may take into account political considerations, they do 
suggest that there are political situations which affect project implementation or 
monitoring which should therefore be taken into account. Human rights may 
under this opinion become relevant but the degree of respect paid by a 
government to human rights cannot by itself be considered an appropriate basis 
for the Bank’s decision to make loans to that government…. Arguably, if a loan is 
rejected on the basis of the authoritarian and suppressive character of the 
government involved, the result may only add another injury to the country’s 
                                                 
63 Prohibition of Political Activities Under the IBRD Articles and Its Relevance to the Work of the 
Executive Directors. Sec M7-1409, at 8 (Dec 23rd, 1987) (Unpublished World Bank doc.) cited in Shihata: 
The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record of Achievements 17 
Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 39 1988-1989 pp.39-66 at p.46 
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population who already are the victims of actions of their own government and 
the inaction by the Bank.”64(Emphasis added) 
This approach has been criticized as rendering the individual’s rights to be subject to 
other (economic) concerns.65 Further, Shihata may have contradicted himself when he 
opined that civil and political rights were outside the purview of the Bank’s mandate, but 
that situations that affect the implementation or monitoring of a project may be taken into 
account. One is at pains to appreciate what scenarios the General Counsel had in mind 
that would be included here while at the same time excluding civil and political rights. If, 
at the time of setting out the “direct and obvious effect” test, Shihata had in mind the fact 
that there are “political situations which affect project implementation or monitoring,” 
and that civil and political rights often have economic effects, then the “degree” of 
human rights enforcement or violation would inevitably have to be considered in making 
World Bank decisions.  
 
Subsequent to Shihata’s views on the matter, two General Counsel of the Bank have 
continued the discussion on this issue. Roberto Dañino issued the next legal opinion 
offered by a General Counsel of the Bank interpreting these provisions on January 27, 
2006. His opinion drew extensively from Shihata’s earlier views. However, while 
agreeing with Shihata’s position that the Bank as a financial institution is encumbered by 
both legal and institutional limitations, Dañino noted that “[n]either of these limitations 
would prevent the Bank from considering non-economic issues, including human rights, 
that have economic consequences or implications, provided this is done in a non-partisan, 
non-ideological and neutral manner, and so long as these are related to projects the Bank 
aims to support. Thus, taking into account, where appropriate, human rights issues and 
                                                 
64 Shihata: The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record of 
Achievements 17 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 39 1988-1989 pp.39-66 at p.47, See also Roberto Daniino: 
Legal Opinion On Human Rights And The Work Of The World Bank Senior Vice President And General 
Counsel. January 27, 2006 (unpublished World Bank document available at www.worldbank.org on file 
with the author) at p.7. 
65 Canan Gunduz (2004), Human Rights and Development: The World Bank’s Need for a Consistent 
Approach. LSE Working Paper Series Publication No. 04-49 ISSN 1470-2320 (on file with the author) at 
p.12 
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members’ international human rights obligations does not contravene the Articles’ 
prohibition on political interference.”66 
 
Dañino further stated that consequently, there are instances in which the Bank may take 
human rights into account, and others in which it should and that indeed there are some 
activities which the Bank cannot properly undertake without considering human rights.67 
In his view, such situations include cases where member countries have human rights law 
obligations that they wish to fulfill such as where a country requests the inclusion of a 
human rights component in a project and the component has an economic impact, or 
where violations or non-fulfillment of obligations are at issue, and where these have an 
economic impact.68 Further more, if a human rights violation leads to a breach of 
international obligations relevant to the Bank, such as those created by binding decisions 
of the UN Security Council, the Bank should take those violations into account. 
Similarly, that the bank can, quite properly, support national development plans or 
instruments such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which include human rights. In 
his view, this would enable the Bank to facilitate realization of human rights in 
partnership with its members, but would not entail the Bank imposing human rights 
obligations on them.69 
 
However, unlike Shihata, Dañino extensively discounted the de-linking civil and political 
rights from economic, social and cultural rights while including human rights in stating 
and interpreting the mandate of the Bank. Stressing the indivisibility of all human rights 
and the evolution of the doctrine of state sovereignty, Dañino opined that the Bank can 
and indeed should consider all human rights within the definition of its political 
prohibition provisions and mandate and should not make a distinction between the 
different types of human rights.70 The interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness 
                                                 
66 Legal Opinion on Human Rights and The Work Of The World Bank Senior Vice President And General 
Counsel. January 27, 2006 (unpublished World Bank document available at www.worldbank.org on file 
with the author) 
67op.cit Danino (2006) Legal Opinion at p. 7, para 18.  
68 op.cit Danino (2006) Legal Opinion at p. 7, para 19-20 
69 ibid 
70 ibid at p.5 e.g. see Article 5, Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 
(UNGA) (July 12, 1993).) 
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of all human rights are widely recognized in International Law.71 Indeed, the Bank is 
cautious of the fact that human rights are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible and 
that its work has an impact on both economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil 
and political rights.72 
 
Ana Palacio, the Bank’s present General Counsel and Senior Vice President,73 provided a 
most succinct analysis of Dañino’s opinion. In her opinion, this document marks a clear 
evolution from the pre-existing restrictive legal interpretation of the Bank’s explicit 
consideration of human rights. It is "permissive": allowing, but not mandating, action on 
the part of the Bank in relation to human rights. It clarifies “the state of the law,” and 
gives the Bank the necessary leeway to explore its proper role in relation to human rights, 
updating the legal stance adopted internally to accord with the Bank’s practice and the 
current international legal context. It facilitates a more comprehensive understanding of 
human rights in development, and enables the Bank to take these issues into account 
where they are relevant. Finally, it represents a point of departure for future legal 
analysis on human rights by the Legal Vice-Presidency as well as further thinking on this 
matter by subsequent General Counsel of the World Bank Group.74  
 
                                                 
71 Article 13, Proclamation of Teheran, UN Doc. A/CONF.32/41 at 3 (1968), GA res.42/102 Indivisibility 
and interdependence of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights. (Adopted at the 93rd Plenary 
Meeting, Dec.7, 1987 available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/513/34/IMG/NR051334.pdf?OpenElement GA 
Res.40/114 ndivisibility and interdependence of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights 
(Adopted at the 116th plenary meeting, 13 Dec. 1985.) Available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/478/21/IMG/NR047821.pdf?OpenElement; GA 
Res. 13/130 (105th Plenary Meeting, Dec. 16th, 1977). 
72 World Bank (1998), Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank ISBN 0-8213-4340-8 
at pp3 and 4 
73 Ana Palacio replaced Dañino, who left the Bank at the end of January 2006. At the time of writing (as at 
May 30th 2007), Ana Palacio is still Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank. 
74 Italics added to emphasize that this shows that the issue is far from resolved and that any future analysis 
by the General Counsel may only raise divergent views, as is indeed argued elsewhere in the thesis, hence 
the ardent need for a different approach and a more resolute solution as is suggested in Chapter four. See 
Ana Palacio (2006), The Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank Article on the World Bank 
Development Outreach, World Bank Institute, October 2006 available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/0,,contentMDK:21106614
~menuPK:445640~pagePK:64020865~piPK:149114~theSitePK:445634,00.html accessed on 27/02/2007 
She further extends the need to cautiously take into account the indivisibility of all rights and the fact that 
state sovereignty may no longer be a tenable defence to the entire human rights question as it has evolved. 
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Palacio further states that it is now clear that the Bank can “and sometimes should” take 
human rights into consideration as part of its decision-making process, but that the 
challenge it is now faced with is to clarify how these legal concepts should be specifically 
incorporated into the work of the Bank in order to further its mission of sustainable and 
equitable development. She then sets out three considerations that the Bank needs to take 
taking into account: first, that many areas of Bank activity have a human rights 
dimension and that there are wide zones of overlap between substantive areas covered by 
core human rights treaties and areas in which the Bank operates but that the Bank 
contributes to the realization of human rights in these different areas, even though its 
policies, programs and projects have never been explicitly or deliberately aimed towards 
the realization of human rights.75 
 
Second, that there is a need for recognition of the role of human rights as legal principles, 
which may inform a broad range of activities, and which may enrich the quality and 
rationale of development interventions, and provide a normative baseline against which 
to assess development policies and programming. And third, that there should be a clear 
understanding that in certain cases and under certain circumstances, human rights 
generate actionable legal obligations. Such obligations may arise from international 
treaties, or from rights enshrined in national laws. Here the Bank’s role is to support its 
Members to fulfill those obligations where they relate to Bank projects and policies.76 
 
Palacio continues to note that from an internal perspective, the Bank’s analytical work 
can benefit from a systematic inclusion of human rights considerations and the broadened 
range of legal analysis these require. Areas such as governance or the legal empowerment 
of the poor are particularly relevant in this respect. However, before stating all the 
foregoing, she notes that in fulfilling this role, the Bank must also respect the legal limits 
imposed by its Articles of Agreement. 77  
 
                                                 
75 ibid 
76 ibid 
77 ibid 
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Palacio’s views show that the Bank is now ready to inculcate human rights in its 
mandate, but that the issue to deal with now is how this should be done. Her enunciation 
of the need to recognize how human rights principles can enrich the quality of 
development (which is the Bank’s sole purpose), and the Bank’s role in supporting 
members to fulfill their human rights obligations need not be overemphasized. But the 
her qualifying all this with the need to keep the Bank’s work within the confines of its 
political prohibition provisions shows that these provisions water down the Bank’s 
potential to reap all the expected outcomes of her suggested pro-human rights approach 
and shows how critical it is to unfetter the Bank’s mandate.  
 
Read together, Danino and Palacio’s views reflect an internal paradigm shift towards a 
pro-human rights approach to the Bank’s work but also reflect the imminence of the need 
to unfetter its mandate from the existing political limitations. Their views also lead to a 
de facto conclusion that while there is no traceable nexus between human rights and the 
Bank’s mandate in the history of the political prohibitions as posited earlier in this 
chapter, their relation with the Bank’s work is undeniable. Therefore, there is room, if not 
need, for the consideration of all human rights issues as part of a more holistic approach 
to development in the operations of the World Bank. This must not be limited to “doing 
no harm” but extend to the adoption of a policy framework that mainstreams human 
rights concerns.78 
 
There are two other issues that need to be kept in mind. First is the potential overlap 
between the Bank and other specialized agencies of the UN that may arise as a result of 
embracing human rights within the Bank’s mandate and second is the question whether 
there is now the necessary political will to include human rights in the Bank’s mandate. 
With regard to the potential overlaps between the Bank’s area of operation, there are a 
number of ways in which this can be dealt with as has been stated elsewhere and as will 
additionally be suggested in chapter four of this paper.79 The question of the necessary 
                                                 
78 Gernot Brodnig The world Bank and Human Rigts: Mission Impossible? Carr Center for Human Rights 
Working Paper T-01-05 at pp.9-13 
79 For a discussion n the possible overlap and attendant limitations to the suggested ways of going round 
such a potential overlap between the Bank’s work and other human rights treaties and specifically 
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political will remains a major challenge. Nevertheless, one may quite easily argue that 
there is barely an indication of any measures to show that this issue is being addressed 
and one way to test for such political will is to bring the issue to create forums at which 
to bring the human rights question to the attention of all members and seek their 
collective and participatory views, such as in an attempt to amend the Articles of 
Agreement, as is further argued below 
 
2.3 To amend or not to amend: which way forward? 
The debate on political prohibition is a vivid illustration of the assertion that there is no 
doubt that the activities of the Bank have changed over the years and are likely to 
experience further variation as the world in which the Bank deals changes.80 The 
difficulties of adapting old legal texts to changing circumstances are well known and 
have been dealt with in every legal system through interpretation and the filling of gaps 
by the courts and legal scholars.81  
 
In the case of the Bank, this power of interpretation was vested in and first extensively 
utilized by the Board of Executive Directors and later delegated to the General Counsel 
who have for a long time now served to clarify all such matters as have needed clarity.82 
On the issues discussed in this chapter, however, these General Counsel interpretations 
have reached a crossroads. Extensive arguments have been canvassed in these opinions as 
to what genres of human rights (that is to say civil and political rights on the one hand or 
economic, social and cultural rights on the other) should be considered in the making of 
World Bank decisions but it is hard to reconcile Dañino and Palacio’s indivisibility 
approach to human rights with Shihata’s lopsided approach as discussed above. Also, 
while her views call for a cautious approach on this issue and notes that from an internal 
viewpoint the Bank’s work can benefit from a systematic inclusion of human rights 
considerations and the broadened analyses these require, Ana Palacio does not provide a 
                                                                                                                                                 
mandated UN Agencies focusing on human rights see D.D. Bradlow and C. Grossman (1996), Limited 
Mandates and Intertwined Problems: The A new Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF Human Rights 
Quarterly 17.3 411-442 at pp.433-437 
80 Shihata (1991): The World Bank in a Changing World, Selected Essays vol. 1 pp.1-2. 
81 ibid 
82 Ibid at p.1 
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concrete approach that would reconcile the divergent views of the Bank’s members on 
which criteria should be used in determining how human rights should be inculcated into 
the Bank’s mandate. 
 
The issue of whether or not the Articles need to be amended thus arises. There is an 
increasing demand on the Bank to be involved in an open way in the protection of 
political rights.83 While some have argued that the articles should be amended to 
encompass human rights,84 others have argued that such an amendment is unnecessary, as 
human rights fall within the purview of the Bank’s mandate.85 Another view is that 
although clarity is required in this area, an amendment would have such consequences as 
opening the Articles to further and easier amendments.86 Consistent with this view is the 
opinion that rather than amend the articles, the General Counsel should, at the request of 
the Board of Executive Directors, provide a legal opinion on what political or human 
rights issues should be covered within or left outside the Bank’s considerations in making 
its decisions.87 
 
Human rights are undoubtedly political matters and to this extent prohibited by the text of 
the Articles, regardless of how the issue is approached. “Stretching” the mandate by way 
of interpretation has only served to heighten the debate, and so will the semantics of 
adopting a rights-based approach without adjusting the mandate. Their inclusion in the 
                                                 
83 Shihata (2000), The World Bank in a Changing World vol.2 at p.151 
84 Levinson, J. (1992): ‘Multilateral Financing Institutions: What Form of Accountability?’ American 
University Journal of International Law and Policy, vol.8 see also Jerome Levinson, ‘Repressive Regimes 
Shouldn’t get a Loan,’ Washington Post, 15 June1998 at A23. 
85 Canan Gunduz (2004), Human Rights and Development: The World Bank’s Need for a Consistent 
Approach. LSE Working Paper Series Publication No. 04-49 ISSN 1470-2320 p.4, 17-21, see also House 
of Commons Canada, From Bretton Woods to Halifax and Beyond: Towards a 21st summit for the 21st 
Century Challenge, Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs in 
International Trade on the issues of International Financial Institutions Reforms for the Agenda of June 
1995 G-7 Halifax Summit, at 38-40 (1995). This report called for a task force to consider inter alia the 
amendment of the Articles of Agreement but no such proposal was made. See also parliamentary assembly 
of the Council of Europe, Report and draft resolution 7th Committee on Economic Affairs and Development 
on the Bretton Woods institutions (Doc. 7256, dated 17 February, 1995). The draft calls for the amendment 
of the Bank’s articles of Agreement. The reports are also cited in Shihata (2000) supra. 
86A discussion between the author and Professor Daniel Bradlow of American University on February 28th, 
2007 at American University Washington College of Law.  
87 A discussion between the author and Professor Daniel Bradlow of American University on February 28th, 
2007 at American University Washington College of Law. 
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work of the Bank is imminent. The issue of whether to include all human rights or 
exclude civil and political rights ought to be approached in light of their indivisible 
nature, thereby leading to the conclusion that civil and political as much as economic, 
social and cultural rights ought to be considered. A legal opinion by the General Counsel 
stating what political and human rights issues should be considered by the Bank in this 
case would be the best alternative.  
 
However, there are limitations to this approach. Firstly, such a legal opinion would not 
settle this issue with finality. These opinions largely differ and such an interpretation will 
only leave room for a later interpretation once Legal Counsel change and others bring 
different and fresh perspectives to the debate. Secondly, the perception of the whole 
notion of human rights and their importance and relationship to development differs 
among countries. A critical question is which yardstick a General Counsel would use in 
determining which rights to include or exclude. In the event of an amendment, however, 
one hopes that involving all the Bank’s members would go a long way in availing all 
members an avenue to voice their views on the attendant issues and help in reaching a 
common position acceptable to all the Bank’s member countries.  
 
Attempting to amend the Articles would entail a two part process: deliberation of all the 
attendant issues by the members and the decision making process. The feasibility of this 
view rests in the assumption that the deliberation process would hopefully be an avenue 
to shed some light on what human rights aspects and dimensions the Banks members 
would want to have included in the Bank’s mandate. The outcome of these deliberations 
would then hopefully present some form of yardstick or measure by which to craft a 
contemporary definition of “political” as distinguished from “economic” issues in terms 
of the Bank’s Articles and which human rights, if any, should be considered in making 
the Bank’s decisions.  
 
Therefore, the Board should be invited to consider whether these provisions should be 
retained or expunged in their entirety from the text of the Bank’s Articles. In the event 
that this is found untenable, an amendment to their text should be considered with the 
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view of including human rights to the extent that their violation affects the Bank’s work 
or impedes the full realization of its intended benefits. The amendment, if approved, will 
serve two purposes. Firstly, it will set out a clear and contemporary definition of what is 
considered “political” and how that is to be distinguished from “economic” and secondly, 
how human rights are to be considered in juxtaposition with the Bank’s work and 
mandate. 
 
While some88 have considered the matter from the viewpoint of amending the articles to 
exclude countries with poor human rights records from World Bank lending, such an 
approach would still inflict double punishment on the populations of those countries as 
discussed earlier. In fact, no government has ever changed its political behavior towards 
its citizens due to suspension of Bank lending.89 Besides, situations may arise (as in the 
case of South Africa during the Apartheid era) that a country with a poor human rights 
record has sound economic policies. Eliminating such countries from World Bank 
lending would be unjustified. The suggested amendment should thus focus on ways of 
encompassing human rights in the mandate of the Bank. After amending the Articles, like 
with the government of Chad (as will be discussed in the next chapter), the Bank may 
then, on a project by project basis, resort to more creative and yet highly stringent 
measures to compel its borrowing members to comply with both their human rights 
obligations as well as their obligations to the Bank. 
 
One of the arguments raised against amending the Articles of Agreement to allow for the 
protection of human rights is that it is a Herculean task that may never succeed. In fact, in 
all the years of its existence, the IBRD articles have only been amended twice, with the 
second amendment making further amendment even harder.90 But it is worth noting, 
albeit with no degree of absolute certainty, that if the Board chooses not to amend the 
Articles, the process could still yield results in reconciling the various divergent views 
discussed above.  
                                                 
88 Shihata (2000), Jerome Levinson, ‘Repressive Regimes Shouldn’t get a Loan,’ Washington Post, 15 
June1998 at A23. 
89 Ibrahim Shihata (2000): The World Bank in a Changing World. Vol. 3 Kluwer Law International, at 
p.182. 
90 Shihata (1991): The World Bank in a Changing World, Selected Essays vol. 1 p.1 
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Concluding remarks. 
The foregoing discussion shows that the issues at hand remain far from being resolved. 
The varying opinions discussed above point to the conclusion that the World Bank as a 
development financial institution cannot effectively do its job while ignoring political 
issues. In the context of human rights, while economic, social and cultural rights have 
long been known to affect the Bank’s mandate, research has shown that substantial 
violation of political and civil rights are related to lower economic growth and that they 
causally affect economic social and cultural rights, and in the process, the rate of 
development in the Bank’s member countries.91 
 
As a development institution, the World Bank in determining the creditworthiness of its 
borrowers needs to look out for human rights issues, not with the intention of deciding 
whether to lend or not to lend, but with the intention of finding creative ways to address 
the problematic concerns against human rights violations that may arise. As will be seen 
in the next chapter, this approach is possible and viable, and in some cases, the 
development of countries well endowed with natural resources and a lot of development 
potential may forever be forgotten if the Bank shuns this approach. Human rights 
considerations vary both in nature and magnitude but are central to the wealth and 
development of nations as well as to the efficiency and continued existence of the World 
Bank.  
 
A lesson to be learned from the South Africa and Portuguese controversy discussed 
earlier in this chapter is that the Bank cannot and need not deny credits to borrowers who 
demonstrate good economic development but are tarred by gross human rights violations. 
The Bank also has to consider the fact that situations where good human rights records 
are demonstrated in the light of poor economic policies may arise. Just as the Bank may 
craft ways to aid economic reform, its role in dealing with human rights issues relevant to 
its mandate and projects is equally important. It is not the researcher’s intention to in any 
                                                 
91 See Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study, (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1997) see also Daniel Kaufmann (2005): Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical 
Challenge. World Bank Institute. (On file with the Author). 
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way suggest that Word Bank funding should be turned into some form of reward for good 
human rights or political performance on the one hand and de facto punishment for 
violation on the other. The solution, as has been variedly opined outside the scope of this 
paper, is to have a country specific approach to development problems.92 As with the 
Chad-Cameroon pipeline discussed in the next chapter, the Bank should seek and 
implement creative ways and means of achieving its desired development ends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
92 See generally Caufield (1996), Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations, Mallaby 
(2004), The World’s Banker: A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises, and The Wealth and Poverty of 
Nations Penguin Books in Chapter 8, pp.207-231 showing how Uganda’s perceived success was attempted 
to be applied else where. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE WORLD BANK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CHAD-CAMEROON 
PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE PROJECT: A BIRD’S EYE 
VIEW. 
 
The Bank’s business is third world development, an activity that might be described as the art – 
for it certainly is not a science – of the life of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. What 
exactly constitutes improvement and how to achieve it have been matters of dispute for more than 
fifty years. But whatever development is, the World Bank is its leader. * 
 
Oil development in Sub-Saharan Africa has a history of ruinous corruption, armed 
conflict, human rights violations and environmental degradation.93 This is true of the 
situation in countries like Nigeria and Angola.94 Despite this negative history, it remains 
a telling commentary on our time that nations can be propelled from obscurity to 
prominence by the simple announcement that oil deposits have been discovered on their 
territory. Such was the case in Chad with the formal approval of the Chad-Cameroon 
Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project.95 Twice the size of Texas in its 
geographical area, with a population of 8.6 million people, a Gross National Income 
(GNI) per capita of US$260, a life expectancy of 48 years and a literacy rate below 50 
                                                 
* Caufield, C. (1998): Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations (Houndmills: 
Macmillan), p. 1 
93 See Korinna Horta (2006), Development Effectiveness and Lessons Learned: The Chad-Cameroon Oil 
Development & Pipeline Project (statement before US Senate Foreign Relations Committee) available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/hearings/2006/hrg060712a.html on file with the author, at p.4. See also 
Gary and Karl (2003), Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor, Catholic Relief Services. 
Available at http://www.crs.org/get_involved/advocacy/policy_and_strategic_issues/oil_report_one.cfm on 
file with the author. 
94 A good example is the situation in Nigeria’s Ogoniland, which the Chad-Cameroon project was feared to 
replicate. See Korinna Horta (1997), Questions Concerning the World Bank and Chad/Cameroon Oil and 
Pipeline Project: Makings of a New Ogoniland? Corporate Welfare Disguised as Aid to the Poor? 
(Environmental Defense Fund, Washington, D.C.). The term Ogoniland refers to the oil-producing 
community in the delta of Nigeria. Although the Ogonis are not the only ethnic group living in the delta, 
they became a symbol of human rights violations and environmental depletion caused by oil exploitation by 
Western multinationals. The same is now said of the Bakola/Bagyeli indigenous people of Cameroon as a 
result of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. For a study of the Ogoniland struggle in the delta of Nigeria, see 
Amos Adeoye Idowu (1999), Human Rights, Environmental Degradation and Oil Multinational Companies 
in Nigeria: The Ogoniland Episode, 17 Netherlands Q. Hum. Rts. 161. For a study of the impact of the 
Chad-Cameroon project on the Bakola/Bagyeli people, see Korinna Horta, Samuel Nguiffo, Delphine 
Djiraibe, (2007), The Chad-Cameroon Oil & Pipeline Project: A Project Non-Completion Report (on file 
with the author). 
95 Donald R. Norland (2003): Innovations of the Chad/Cameroon Pipeline Project: Thinking outside the 
Box Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2003 pp.46-59 at p.46 
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per cent,96 Chad is one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in the world, ranking 
167th out of 177 countries.97  
 
Against this background, the Chad-Cameroon project was seen by the Bank as “an 
unprecedented framework to transform oil wealth into direct benefit for the poor.”98 The 
Bank thus set out to create a project with unique and stringent methods of supervision, 
monitoring and revenue management. The project has since become very widely 
publicized and criticized for initially bringing excitement and later resulting in shattered 
hopes for the people of Chad on one hand and satisfaction for the Bank on the other 
hand.99 
 
This chapter takes stock of the Bank’s role in the Chad-Cameroon project against the 
backdrop of human rights and development, with specific restriction to events in Chad. 
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part comprises of a description of the 
project and how it was financed. The second part discusses the Bank’s role and the 
Project Revenue Management Plan. The third part evaluates the monitoring and 
supervision mechanisms, and the fourth draws together the conclusion. 
 
                                                 
96 op.cit Donald R. Norland at p.46. See also World Bank: Implementation Completion Report on Two 
IBRD Loans in the Amount of US$39.5 Million and In the Amount of US$ 53.4 Million Respectively to 
the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Cameroon for a Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project 
December 15 2006 (on file with the athor) at p.2 varying figures are available at 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/chad_statistics.html  the fugures relied on above are those obtained 
from the World Bank 
97 Ian Gary, Nikki Reisch  (2005), Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s 
Newest Petro-State at p.15 
98 World Bank Press Release on approval of the project, June 2000. See also D. Djiraibe, K. Horta, S. 
Nguiffo, (2004) Access to Justice from Local Village to Global Boardroom: An Experience in International 
Accountability The World Bank Inspection Panel and the Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project 
available at http://www.ifiwatchnet.org/documents/item.shtml?x=43583 on file with the author.  
99 In December 2006 (two years after the completion of the project), the Bank rated its performance as 
satisfactory. See World Bank: Implementation Completion Report on Two IBRD Loans in the Amount of 
US$39.5 Million and In the Amount of US$ 53.4 Million Respectively to the Republic of Chad and the 
Republic of Cameroon for a Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project December 15 2006 (on file with 
the author) at p.13 See also instance Korinna Horta (2001), Chad-Cameroon: Oil Revenues Versus Human 
Rights and Environment, World Rainforest Movement Bulletin April 1, 2001 at p. 1, further see Ian Gary, 
Nikki Reisch  (2005), Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money In Africa’s Newest Petrostate 
at p.1 For a discussion of the criticism of the project, generally also see Donald R. Norland: Innovations of 
the Chad/Cameroon Pipeline Project: Thinking outside the Box Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2003 
pp.46-59 
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3.1 The Project: Unprecedented Precedent. 
The project consisted of a public-private partnership between the government of Chad, 
the World Bank, and a consortium of oil companies—including ExxonMobil as leading 
shareholder with a 40% stake, Petroleum Nasional Berhad (Petronas) and Chevron with 
35% and 25% stakes, respectively. These organizations collaborated in the development 
of three oil fields in the vicinity of Doba in Southern Chad, a project that included the 
drilling of about 300 wells, the construction of associated infrastructure, and the 
construction of a pipeline 30 inches in diameter and 1,070 kilometers in length, buried 1 
meter in depth, from the Doba oil fields to Cameroon’s Atlantic coast at Kribi. The 
pipeline also has three pumping stations, ancillary facilities and infrastructure 
improvements, as well as offshore floating storage, offloading vessels and related 
facilities.100 The project was completed in 2004, a year ahead of schedule.101  
 
3.1.1 Financing 
At a final cost of US$ 4.8 billion,102 the project is the single largest investment in Sub-
Saharan Africa today. The consortium of companies involved, complemented by World 
Bank loans, sourced the required capital. Project finance included loans from the World 
Bank Group: IBRD loans to Chad and Cameroon worth $92.9 million and a IFC loan 
worth $200 million, a European Investment Bank loan worth $41.5 million and loans 
from three different Export Credit Agencies: $200 million from the U.S. EXIM Bank, 
$200 million from COFACE (France) and $500 million from the African Ex-Im Bank. 
The equity partners – ExxonMobil, Chevron and Petronas – who covered the full cost of 
oil field development and one third of the export facilities, met more than half of the total 
                                                 
100 World Bank (2006): Implementation Completion Report on Two IBRD Loans in the Amount of 
US$39.5 Million and In the Amount of US$ 53.4 Million Respectively to the Republic of Chad and the 
Republic of Cameroon for a Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project December 15 2006 (on file with 
the author) at p.3 See also B. C. Esty, (2001), The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline 
Project (A). Harvard Business School pp. 1-2 and Donald R. Norland: Innovations of the Chad/Cameroon 
Pipeline Project: Thinking outside the Box Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2003 pp.46-59 at p. 47 
101Ian Gary, Nikki Reisch  (2005), Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s 
Newest Petro-State at p.25  
102op.cit World Bank (2006) at p. 23. Varying sources present different figures for the cost of the pipeline. 
Project cost was originally estimated at $ 3.7 billion. In an October 2004 presentation ExxonMobil stated 
that the total cost was $4.2 billion. The divergence is explained by the fact that the ultimate cost of the 
project exceeded the estimates. In December 2006, the Bank offered 4.8 billion as the final cost of the 
project. 
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project cost. Two commercial banks provided the rest of the financing: ABN-Amro and 
Credit Agricole Indosuez.103 
 
3.2 World Bank Involvement 
There are a number of reasons that account for the World Bank’s involvement in the 
Chad Cameroon project. Firstly, the Bank provided political risk insurance to the other 
lenders involved. Bank staff including President Wolfenson made it clear that they were 
aware of the risks involved, but that there were viable means to address such risks.104 In 
the Bank’s own words, “[its] involvement, … provide[ed] comfort to [the] oil companies 
and lenders that the political risks presented by this cross-border operation and first-time 
petroleum export venture from Chad [could] be adequately mitigated….”105 The Bank 
was a logical choice to approach for this insurance because it is rated as a first class 
borrower on the international financial market, has extensive lending and policy 
experience with developing countries, and has been working with Chad and Cameroon 
for many years.106 
 
Other reasons, both positive and negative, influenced the Bank’s decision to participate. 
On the positive side, the Bank saw this as a commercially viable project in which it could 
ensure that the host countries would receive returns that were commensurate with the 
risks they would bear. It also saw this project as one that would allow the Bank to play an 
important role in protecting the environment and indigenous people.107 Thirdly, the 
project presented a promising opportunity to jumpstart Chad’s economy.108 
 
 On the negative side, there was a genuine concern within the Bank that if it did not get 
                                                 
103 Source: World Bank Group, Export Credit Agencies, Afreximbank, Environmental Defense, Petroleum 
Economist (Feb. 16, 2004 – “Chad-Cameroon: Against All Odds”) see also Ian Gary, Nikki Reisch  (2005), 
Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s Newest Petro-State at p.6. 
104 Ian Gary, Nikki Reisch  (2005), Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s 
Newest Petro-State at p.15, see also B. C. Esty, (2001), The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and 
Pipeline Project (A). Harvard Business School p.5 
105 World Bank, Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project: Project Appraisal 
Document, April 2003, 2000, Annex 4, p.63, para. 8. 
106Op.cit B. C. Esty, (2001), at p.5 
107 Ibid at p.6 
108 ibid at p.6. See also Ian Gary, Nikki Reisch  (2005), at p.10 
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involved, sponsors might abandon the project and look to invest in safer countries, or, 
worse, Chad might have sought to develop its oil fields with the aid of other neighboring 
countries, notably Sudan and Egypt, both major oil exporters.109 Partnerships with these 
countries would have had negative effects on the internal civil strife in Chad. The 
Sudanese government had recently financed a pipeline without the Bank’s help and was 
using the proceeds to fund a civil conflict in Darfur. In addition, Libya’s President 
Muammar Quaddafi had been urging Chad’s President Derby to drop his deal with the 
west and ship oil through Libya. Both of these countries had been classified by the United 
States as terrorist countries, nevertheless they presented a feasible option for exporting 
oil.110  
 
The Bank should be lauded for ultimately deciding to fund the project. All of the above 
reasons reflect a desire to aid development in Chad, or at least to avoid aggravating the 
country’s poverty and civil strife with oil proceeds. However, the above discussion also 
shows that in deciding whether to invest in Chad or not, civil strife, bad governance and 
regional politics were just as important as economic development and poverty 
eradication. This is as true of other poor countries and just like in this case the Articles on 
political prohibition were not reason enough for the Bank not to invest, so should it be 
elsewhere. 
 
The Bank’s involvement was not without critical opposition from some of the other Bank 
members,111 the local population in Chad and Cameroon, academics and civil society 
organizations. Some of the factors of contention included the political volatility in Chad, 
fears that the project would exacerbate the already terrible state of corruption in Chad, the 
potential misuse of oil proceeds in Chad as in other African oil exporting countries and 
                                                 
109 ibid B.C. Esty (2001) 
110B. C. Esty, (2001), The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (A). Harvard 
Business School p.7 
111For instance, the Dutch and German governments considered the initial Environmental studies on the 
project insufficient and made independent reports to that effect, prompting fresh environmental studies that 
were19 volumes and reflected some changes in response to the inadequacies raised in the independent 
studies. See Association Tchadienne pour la promotion et Defense des Droits de l’Homme, Chad, Centre 
pour l’Environment et le Development, Cameroon, Environmental Defense Fund, U.S.A. (1999): The Chad 
Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project: Putting People and the Environment at Risk, p.3 
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inadequate compensation of land owners who lived along the route of the pipeline.112 
Several civil society organizations within and outside Chad and Cameroon watched over 
the project and made numerous informative reports, drawing attention to the project.113 
For example, when Mr. Ngarledji Yorongar, a Parliamentarian in Chad was arrested, held 
in jail for nine months, and tortured, these organizations alerted the Bank’s president, 
who intervened for Mr. Yorongar’s release.114 This example also shows that World Bank 
funded projects may often give rise to political and human rights situations which only 
the Bank has the capacity and influence to resolve and its intervention ought not to be 
hampered by its limited mandate. 
 
These organizations also played a central role in exposing major weaknesses in both the 
project itself and the Bank’s role that were excluded from later Bank evaluation 
documents.115 A number of these weaknesses were presented in two complaints before the 
World Bank Inspection Panel. In one of these complaints, the panel found that the Bank 
had flouted some of its own Operation Procedures and Directives (ODs).116 Examples of 
such findings included the lack of consideration of the spacio-temporal context of the 
project, as was required by OD 4.01, the lack of cumulative effect assessment of the 
project and failure by the Bank’s management to prepare a Regional Environmental 
                                                 
112 Donald R. Norland (2003): Innovations of the Chad/Cameroon Pipeline Project: Thinking outside the 
Box Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2003 pp.46-59 at p. 49-50 
113 Such organizations include Amnesty International, Catholic Relief Services, Bank Information Centre, 
Environmental Defence, Friends of the Earth, Association Tchadienne pour la Promotion et la Défense des 
Droits de l’Homme, Chad, Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement, Coordination permanente 
Pétrole Locale, Groupe de Recherches Alternatives et de Monitoring du Project Pétrole Tchad Cameroun. 
Groupe de Concertation et d’Action 
114 G. Brodnig (2003), “This is the President of the World Bank Calling…” in Amnesty International: 
Human Rights Trade and Investment Matters, ISBN1 8733_865 6 at p.8  
115 One such report that succinctly summarized the weaknesses of the project was jointly authored by 
Environmental Defence, Catholic Relief Services and Bank Information Centre titled The Chad-Cameroon 
Petroleum Development &Pipeline Project Environmental and Social Problems Identified by the External 
Compliance Monitoring Group, the International Advisory Group and The Inspection Panel (2004). See 
also Association Tchadienne pour la Promotion et la Defense des Droits de I’Homme Chad, Centre pour 
I’Environnement et le Developpement, Cameroon, Environmental Defense Fund: The Chad Cameroon Oil 
and Pipeline Project: Putting People and the Environment at Risk. P.14. 
116 World Bank, The Inspection Panel, Investigation Report: Chad-Cameroon Petroleum and Pipeline 
Project (Loan No. 4558-CD); Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project (Credit No.3373-
CD); and Management of the Petroleum Economy (Credit No. 3316-CD), See also World Bank: 
Implementation Completion Report on Two IBRD Loans in the Amount of US$39.5 Million and In the 
Amount of US$ 53.4 Million Respectively to the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Cameroon for a 
Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project December 15 2006 (on file with the author) Annex 11, 
notably pp.53-55 
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Assessment, which would have assessed the nature and extent of broader environmental 
and social concerns resulting from the project.117  
 
Paragraph 19 of Operation Directive 4.01 further requires that as part of the Bank’s 
policies, it is required to consult the communities that are likely to or are being affected 
by the projects it finances.118 In assessing how this process was carried out in Chad, the 
panel noted that consultation of affected persons was conducted in the presence of 
security forces, which is incompatible with the Bank’s policy requirements. Further, the 
panel remarked that as has been noted in previous Inspection Panel reports, full and 
informed consultation is impossible if those consulted perceive that they could be 
penalized for expressing their opposition to, or honest opinions about, a Bank financed 
project.119 All of the above concerns related directly to the violation of human rights of the 
local people in the areas where the project was to be built, illustrating the fact that World 
Bank funded projects do have human rights and political consequences. 
 
More directly on the issue of human rights, the Inspection Panel regurgitated the “direct 
and obvious effect” test discussed in chapter two, but disagreed with management’s 
narrow interpretation and application of when and how relevant human rights were to this 
project. In its own words, the panel stated:  
 
“On the fiftieth anniversary of [the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
adopted in 1948], the Bank wrote, “The World Bank believes that creating the 
conditions for attainment of human rights is a central and irreducible goal of 
development. By placing the dignity of every human being – especially the 
poorest – at the very foundation of its approach to development, the Bank 
helps the people in every part of the world to build lives of purpose and hope. 
And while the Bank has always taken measures to ensure that human rights 
are fully respected in connection with the projects it supports, it has been less 
forthcoming about articulating its role in promoting human rights within the 
                                                 
117 ibid para 9, p.54 this was found to be in non compliance with paragraph 5 of OD 4.01 
118 ibid p.57 
119 ibid Implementation Completion Report at p.57 
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countries in which it operates.”120    
 
The panel acknowledged that there were other institutions including UN bodies 
specifically in charge of this subject. However, it stated that it “felt obliged to examine 
issues of human rights violations in Chad where they were such as to impede the 
implementation of the project in a manner compatible with the Bank’s policies.”121  
 
The panel also commended the Bank’s management for encouraging frequent 
consultation with local communities and civil societies in a more conducive 
environment122 and further noted that on more than one occasion the President of the 
Bank had intervened when political repression seemed severe.123 With regard to reports 
that local leaders had expressed their opinion about the project without incurring physical 
violence but while being harassed, the panel observed that this situation was far from 
ideal and that this raised questions about compliance with Bank policies.124 One would 
then have expected the panel to highlight the questions to which it alluded, and to provide 
answers to these questions, in a bid to guide the Bank’s practice in similar situations 
should they arise in future projects. Unfortunately, the panel neither discussed the 
questions to which it made reference, nor suggested better ways in which such situations 
involving the participation of communities should be dealt with in future. As such, with 
regard to the issue of public participation, the panel’s approach is superficial, to say the 
least. This buttresses the need for a comprehensive and well publicized Bank policy on 
public participation alluded to earlier in this paper. 
                                                 
120 World Bank, The Inspection Panel, Investigation Report: Chad-Cameroon Petroleum and Pipeline 
Project (Loan No. 4558-CD); Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project (Credit No.3373-
CD); and Management of the Petroleum Economy (Credit No. 3316-CD) at p. 62 (Emphasis in original) 
121 Inspection Panel, Investigation Report, Chadian Claim, p.61-62. See also World Bank: Implementation 
Completion Report on Two IBRD Loans in the Amount of US$39.5 Million and In the Amount of US$ 
53.4 Million Respectively to the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Cameroon for a Petroleum 
Development and Pipeline Project December 15 2006 (on file with the author) Annex 11Para 35, P. 58  
122 World Bank, The Inspection Panel, Investigation Report: Chad-Cameroon Petroleum and Pipeline 
Project (Loan No. 4558-CD); Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project (Credit No.3373-
CD); and Management of the Petroleum Economy (Credit No. 3316-CD), See also World Bank: 
Implementation Completion Report on Two IBRD Loans in the Amount of US$39.5 Million and In the 
Amount of US$ 53.4 Million Respectively to the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Cameroon for a 
Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project December 15 2006 (on file with the author) Annex 11, 
notably pp.53-55 
123ibid para 37  
124 ibid para 37, p.59 
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The Inspection Panel should be credited for its approach to the human rights impact 
resulting from the project. However, the panel’s approach did not translate into the 
remedial action sought by the complainants. Gross human rights violations went 
unabated.125 In one of its reports, Amnesty International categorized the rights broadly 
violated to include violation of the rights to: a remedy, non discrimination and equal 
protection of the law, the environmental right to a clean and healthy environment, health 
and safe working conditions, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and access to 
knowledge.126 Some examples included the pacification of oil critics, summary and 
extrajudicial executions, massacre of unarmed civilians by government troops, 
inadequate and unfair compensation of land owners and involuntary resettlement and dust 
emissions that were not addressed resulting into disease outbreaks.127  
 
The failure by the Bank to comply with its Operation Directives directly allowed the 
perpetration of human rights violations. For example, if the Bank had ensured compliance 
with its environmental protection measures, all the environmental (and to some extent 
health) human rights violations cited above would not have occurred. The Inspection 
Panel, as an evaluative mechanism is intended to hold the Bank accountable to its 
members in the execution of its duties. On most of the complaints it handled, especially 
those relating to environmental and regional impact assessment and the issue of 
consultation in a friendly environment,128 the Panel simply stated that more monitoring 
was required, but did not set the standards for such monitoring. The Panel would have 
done better by suggesting measures to remedy the situation. Pointing out these failures on 
the part of the Bank is a positive step, but an inconclusive one. A comprehensive human 
                                                 
125 US Department of State 1999b Chad Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2003. Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, February 25th 2004, US Department of State, Bureau of African 
Affairs, Background note on Chad January 2002 (Amnesty International AI-Index: AFR 20/004/1997. Ian 
Gary, Nikki Reisch  (2005), Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s Newest 
Petro-State at p.17-19, end note 34, Amnesty International, Contracting Outside Human Rights: The Chad 
Cameroon Project ISBN 1873328 62 1 see also Ndoube Nkoto: Social Closure in the Chad Cameroon 
Pipeline: The Right to Repairs Damage or the Right to Profit? Available at http://www.eca-
watch.org/problems/oil_gas_mining/FOCARFE_pipelinemay05.htm visited on 26/03/2007 
126 ibid Amnesty International, Contraacting Outside Human Rights at pp. 15, 17, 34-40. 
127 ibid 
128 See notes 117,119 and 124 above and accompanying text. 
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rights approach should be one that guides even evaluative mechanisms on how this 
accountability is to be ensured. One may arguably say that the Panel’s shortcomings lie in 
the limitations to which it can stretch its mandate in light of the overall mandate of the 
Bank, which is fettered by political prohibition and thereby restricting proactive 
approaches to the protection of human rights.  
 
Thus, the Panel’s failure is an indication of an even bigger flaw in the Bank’s approach to 
human rights. As discussed in chapter two, the Bank has always distanced itself from 
requiring the enforcement of certain human rights (notably civil and political rights as 
discussed in chapter two). The broad range of rights affected by this project exemplifies 
how in their interrelated nature, human rights can be affected by the Bank’s projects. As 
will further be discussed in chapter four, this interface of all these human rights in a 
project involving the Bank therefore draws the suggestion that the Bank as the architect 
of these projects should critically study the human rights situation in the Borrower 
country and come up with ways to improve it or avoid its aggravation. The Bank may 
then initiate collaboration and champion synergy between other UN agencies it deems 
more appropriate to deal with the human rights issues that surround or result from its 
investment. This may require measures such as drafting a specific human rights policy as 
part of its Operation Directives that must be complied with in all the projects it funds but 
this still raises the issue as to whether it can go to such an extent with its present 
limitations in the Articles of Agreement. 
  
3.2.1 A Unique Revenue Management Plan. 
In order to enhance transparency in the management of oil revenues, the Bank 
orchestrated a unique revenue management plan. Oversight and control was to be done by 
the Bank and the Chadian government, but all sector expenditure programs would require 
the approval of a newly formed oversight committee of nine members, the College de 
Controle et de Surveillance des Resources Petrolieres (the Oversight Committee on the 
Management of Petroleum Resources, known as the College).129  
                                                 
129 World Bank (2006), Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development And Pipeline Project: Overview Report 
No. 36569-TD (on file with the author) at p.v, see also Esty op.cit at p.8 
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The plan was set out in legislation that came to be known as Law 001 and, inter alia, 
comprised of setting up an overseas escrow account into which the proceeds from the 
project would be deposited. The Chadian government committed that it would spend 80% 
of the revenue on poverty eradication and set up a separate account for future 
generations. Resources were to be allocated according to the different needs of the 
different communities.130 Suffice it to note here that in setting such conditions, the Bank, 
in a bid to ensure the success of this project, got involved in what Shihata had described 
as “such typical economic and technical issues, as the management of money or finances, 
or more generally, the management of a country’s resources” and had advised the Bank 
not to get consider as part of its work in order to steer clear of violating its apolitical 
mandate.131 This illustrates how indivisible political and economic issues are in the 
Bank’s work and the importance of political issues in its decision-making.  
 
Law 001 was criticized as being an infringement on sovereign rights, lacking the detail to 
ensure effective oversight and at best, only a first and clearly insufficient step.132 It did 
not cover all the proceeds from the project, as it covered only three oil fields, and did not 
take into consideration the potential of more oil production beyond these three fields.133 
Also, the future generation account was not part of the revenues that were governed by 
Law 001.134 
 
It did not take long for the plan to show signs that it would boomerang. In January 2001, 
as soon as the deal was signed and Chad received a US$ 25 million signing bonus, the 
president spent part of the money to purchase arms. The government of Chad later 
amended Law 001, precipitating the Bank to suspend any further disbursements on active 
                                                 
130 World Bank (2006), Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development And Pipeline Project: Overview Report 
No. 36569-TD (on file with the author) at p.v, see also Esty op.cit at p.8 
131 See Chapter 2, note 22 and accompanying text, discussing Shihata’s definition of the term “political” 
as was intended to be used in the Articles of Agreement. 
132B. C. Esty, (2001), The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (A). Harvard 
Business School p.9-10  
133 Ian Gary, Nikki Reisch  (2005), Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s 
Newest Petro-State at p.13. 
134 ibid at pp. 42-48 the report contains an indepth analysis of the above and more weaknesses of Law 001. 
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operations in Chad until an amicable understanding was reached because the amendments 
were in breach of key provisions of the legal agreements signed with the Bank. As the 
operation of Law 001 was directly related to the Bank’s involvement and the operation of 
the escrow account, the suspension of further World Bank disbursements in turn, led to 
the freezing of the London based escrow account into which the oil revenues were being 
deposited by the consortium.135  
 
Sadly, this did not have as much effect as was expected because the government 
immediately exploited the lacunae in Law 001 to access the funds on the future 
generation account.136 Later, the oversight committee reported problems with government 
spending of the oil revenues, including irregularities in the transfer of funds and the 
overpricing of goods and services. The situation became so critical that in August 2005, 
the Bank stated that it had serious concerns about how the Chadian government was 
using the revenues.137 
 
In the heat of political tensions that preceded the Presidential elections in Chad in May 
2006, the Bank announced that it had signed a memorandum with the government of 
Chad. The Bank allowed the Chadian government to exclude the future generations 
account from the amended law, to decrease the percentage of oil proceeds devoted to 
poverty eradication from 80% to 70%, and to include the hitherto excluded military 
spending into priority sectors of Chad’s budget, which meant that some of the oil 
proceeds could be spent on military expenditure, – a position the Bank had avoided in the 
first place by insisting on the exclusion of military spending from priority sectors.138 The 
resultant understanding is a reflection of the fact that by the time the oil revenues begun 
to flow, the Bank had substantially lost its bargaining power with Chad. In essence, this 
shows that political factors not only influence the Bank’s decision making but also its 
relations with its Borrowers before, during and after a given project.  
                                                 
135 ibid World Bank (2006), see also K. Horta, Development Effectiveness and Lessons Learned: The 
Chad-Cameroon Oil & Pipeline Project (2006) (on file with the Author) p.28 
136 ibid  
137 Dino Mahtani, World Bank Concern over Chad oil Revenues. Financial Times, August 20 2005, See 
also, K. Horta, (2006) at p.8 
138 K. Horta, Development Effectiveness and Lessons Learned: The Chad-Cameroon Oil & Pipeline Project 
(2006) (on file with the Author) p.9 
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The strategic innovation of the revenue management plan can be criticized but also 
appreciated. The major criticism against the plan used in this project was that it 
constituted an incursion on Chad’s sovereignty. The plan and the newly created College 
suffered several flaws—especially the lack of funds and the capacity necessary to 
exercise its investigative authority. More than a year into Chad’s life as an oil producer, 
many aspects of the oil management system were still being set up and lacked definition. 
There was also a profound lack of technical capacity in the petroleum ministry and other 
relevant departments.139 However, it must be noted that it was not the idea but its 
implementation that failed. Viewed as a step towards poverty eradication and 
development of the poor, this plan was a good initiative by the Bank and a major step 
towards achieving its mandate.  
 
Also, one may justifiably view such a plan as an incursion on state sovereignty.140 But 
there are two reasons to discount this argument. Firstly, even though they were organized 
around the principle of sovereignty, the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions 
constituted a movement away from an international legal order based on absolute 
sovereignty.141 The doctrine of state sovereignty has suffered incursion in other spheres 
on the international scene and is now said to have “evolved.”142 In fact, the very act of 
                                                 
139Ian Gary, Nikki Reisch  (2005), Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s 
Newest Petro-State at p.50 
140 This paper does recognize the principle of state sovereignty as established in the Lotus Case (The Case 
of the S.S. “Lotus”), Judgment 9, 1927, PCIJ Series A, No. 10, P.19 that the sovereignty of state is plenary 
in the absence of specific legal constraints to the contrary and that one does not presume or presume lightly, 
that the sovereignty of states is restricted. But the argument here is that the restriction discussed in this 
chapter is justified. 
141 Bradlow and Grossman (1995) Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for the 
World Bank and the IMF. Human Rights Quarterly 17.3 (1995) 411-442 at p.418 At p. 418-419 and note 
31 and accompanying text where Bradlow and Grossman further argue that World Bank lending, which 
entails imposition of some non-financial conditions has contributed to the erosion of absolute state 
sovereignty. 
142 Ana Palacio (2006), The Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank. World Bank Development 
Outreach, World Bank Institute, October 2006 p.2, see also H.J. Steiner and P. Alston, International Human 
Rights: Law, Politics and Morals 2nd ed p.573, R. Danino, Legal Opinion on Human Rights and The World 
Bank, January 27th 2006 pp 6-7, Danino (2005), The Legal Aspects of World Bank’s Work on Human 
Rights Some Preliminary Thoughts (in P. Alston and M. Robinson (Ed.), Human Rights and Development: 
Towards Mutual Reinforcement oxford University Press. P. 509-525). See also Bradlow and Grossman 
(1995) Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF. 
Human Rights Quaterly 17.3 (1995) 411-442 at p.411. They argue that the sovereign power states have a 
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allowing an institution to intrude on its sovereignty is itself an act of sovereignty.143 
Secondly, arguing the Bank should never have intruded on Chad’s sovereignty is 
tantamount to positing the view that it is an error to place development before state 
sovereignty. This raises the conundrum of whether the poor actually matter in the 
development process.  
 
One alternative to avoid this incursion on state sovereignty was for the Bank to decline 
involvement in the project. But this raises the issue of what better options are available to 
borrowing countries, in this case, whether the situation would have been better if the 
project had been developed by Sudan or Libya. One must always remember the universal 
conviction that, should the Bank decide to ostracize a borrower, all other major national 
and international powers will follow its lead.144 
 
In criticizing the plan, another alternative that was offered was for the Bank to strengthen 
loan conditions that reinforce the democratic process in Chad and enable the Chadian 
people to better determine how their resources should be spent. This, it was argued would 
still threaten the sovereignty of leaders but would also empower the people.145 There are 
significant limitations to this view. Firstly, such a process would hardly be possible 
without addressing civil and political rights (such as the right to vote), which the Bank 
has for a while considered to lie outside its mandate.  
 
Secondly, with wealth creating neighbors emerging in Africa and expressing willingness 
to fund such projects (in this case Libya and Sudan) and increasing Afro-Sino relations 
presenting the option of unconditional financing to African governments, tightening 
                                                                                                                                                 
diminished ability to manage the behavior within their borders and that this means that the resolution of 
most problems requires collaborative efforts that involve both states and nonstate actors. At note 12 and 
accompanying text, they illustrate the fact that the intertwined nature of the World’s problems today has 
helped breakdown the distinction that the international community has maintained between purely domestic 
and purely international problems. But see also p.426  
143 A discussion with Dr. Edward Kwakwa, Legal Counsel World Intellectual Property Organization, a 
specialist in International Law. March 28th Washington D.C. 
144 Caufield, C. (1998): Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations (Houndmills: 
Macmillan), p.336 
145 B. C. Esty, (2001), The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (A). Harvard 
Business School p.10 
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World Bank conditionality is more likely to push away poor borrowing countries than it 
was years ago when they had fewer options. Thirdly, the argument falls short of 
recognizing the gravity of human rights violations and the extent to which leaders in such 
countries are willing and able to go in order to perpetrate personally motivated agendas. 
It is hard to see how tightening conditionality would have democratically empowered the 
people in a country where the President was willing to go as far as amending the 
constitution to secure a third term.146 
 
3.3 Monitoring and supervision. 
Monitoring took different forms: operator monitoring, government monitoring (through 
the Comité Technique Nationale de Suivi et de Contrôle (CTNSC) - the government body 
in Chad charged with oversight of the environmental and social impacts of the petroleum 
sector – as well as World Bank monitoring and two independent monitoring panels (the 
External Compliance Monitoring Group (ECMG), and the International Advisory Group 
(IAG)).147  
 
The IAG was a five-member independent body of experts created by the Bank in 2001 to 
monitor the implementation of the project and advise the project sponsors, host 
governments and the Bank senior management on the achievement of the broad 
objectives of the project and the three ancillary capacity building projects.  The IAG 
visited the two countries twice a year and reported directly to the World Bank 
president.148 The ECMG, staffed by D’Appalonia, a consulting firm, was contracted by 
the IFC to monitor the Consortium’s compliance with the environmental management 
plan. Throughout project implementation, the ECMG conducted quarterly site visits.  
After project completion (certified in 2004) the ECMG was mandated to conduct yearly 
                                                 
146 Ian Gary, Nikki Reisch  (2005), Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s 
Newest Petro-State at p.19. 
147 World Bank (2006), Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development And Pipeline Project: Overview Report 
No. 36569-TD (on file with the author) at p.vii, see also Ian Gary, Nikki Reisch  (2005), Chad’s Oil: 
Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa’s Newest Petro-State at p.13. 
148 its reports were available on the Internet.http://www.gic-iag.org/ehome.htm  
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visits.149  
 
The use of such measures of monitoring and supervision was one of the novel aspects of 
the project, and helped to scrutinize the Chad government and the consortium. The 
mandate of these three monitoring bodies involved a critical look at the human rights 
implications of the project and how it was affecting the communities in Chad. IAG 
reports for instance constantly reported tensions on political issues and worker rights in 
Chad during the construction of the project.150 If the Bank is to use such monitoring 
groups and they raise human rights concerns, it should be prepared to address these 
concerns without being limited by its Articles of Agreement. It is not enough for the 
Bank to set up institutions whose advice it will not act upon. This is the essence of 
popular participation, and the pith and marrow of some of its Operational Policies and 
Procedures.151  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
The Chad-Cameroon project presents many lessons on the role of the Bank, in such 
development projects in countries like Chad with enormous resources and multiple 
human rights and political problems. This chapter has demonstrated that it is important 
for the Bank to consider political factors when deciding whether to invest in a country or 
not, despite the provisions in its Articles of Agreement that require otherwise. In some 
cases, the decision not to invest may have adverse consequences for the people of its 
member countries. In the case of Chad, political factors played a key role not just in the 
Bank’s relations with the country prior to the investment, but also throughout the 
construction of the pipeline. The Bank thus deserves credit for ultimately deciding to 
invest in Chad.  
 
                                                 
149op.cit Ian Grey and Nikki (2005) at p.13. Since their first visit to the project site in February 2001, the 
ECMG has published 10 reports. These and other information about the ECMG can be found on the World 
Bank’s website at: www.worldbank.org/afr.ccproj/project/pro_monitor.htm  
150 See For instance International Advisory Group: Chad Cameroon Petroleum Development And Pipeline 
Project Report Of Mission To Cameroon And Chad November 14–25, 2001 December 21, 2001 
pp.2,6,12,13, International Advisory Group: Chad Cameroon Petroleum Development And Pipeline Project 
Report of Visit to Chad June 3-17, 2002 July 12, 2002 p.9, paras 54 and 55. 
151 See for instance paragraph 19 of its OD 4.01 
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The strategic design of the project was innovative. It was flawed in some ways, but that 
shows the need for a clearer focus on the issues discussed above. Having shown the role 
of political and human rights issues towards the relationship between the Bank and Chad 
in this project, it is important for the Bank to design a better approach for addressing 
these issues in future projects. The Bank should be reminded by the Chad-Cameroon 
pipeline that development of the poor – in whichever way perceived – is its business, and 
political prohibition is no excuse in failing in this daunting task. The Bank must be 
careful not to lose sight of the fact that every single failure in its work aggravates the 
situation it sets out to remedy in the first place. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
 
“It is now clear that the Bank can [and sometimes] should take human rights into consideration 
as part of its decision-making process. The challenge we now face is to clarify how these legal 
concepts should be specifically incorporated into the work of the Bank in order to further its 
mission of sustainable and equitable development…”♠ 
 
4.1 Conclusions. 
This research paper has discussed the World Bank’s approach to political prohibitions in 
light of its role in promoting the protection of human rights. The paper has noted that 
human rights are political issues that the Bank’s Articles prohibit its staff from 
considering when making its decisions. That never the less, in the recent years, the World 
Bank has increasingly moved towards integrating human rights within its work.152 The 
Bank has even devoted resources to analyzing what impact human rights have on its 
projects, detailing its “record of achievement” on human rights. The paper notes that the 
Bank has become more aware than ever before of the need to have human rights within 
its mandate and taken note of the empirical relationship between human rights and 
development.153  
 
From cases like the South Africa and Portugal loan controversy and more recently the 
Chad-Cameroon Pipeline project the paper has shown that human rights cannot be 
divorced from the Bank’s work and in essence, from the realization of its mandate. It has 
                                                 
♠Ana Palacio (2006), The World Bank and Human Rights: The way forward. The words “and sometimes” 
are in brackets because the view espoused in this paper is that human rights should be taken into 
consideration by the Bank in all cases. 
152 Gernot Brodnig The world Bank and Human Rigts: Mission Impossible? Carr Center for Human Rights 
Working Paper T-01-05 at p.9, I.F.I. Shihata: The World Bank and Human Rights: An analysis of the Legal 
Issues and Record of Achievements. 17 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Policy 39-66. See also Shihata, Human Rights, 
Development and International Financial Institutions. Vol.8 Am.U.J. Int’l L &Policy 27 1992-1993. Pp. 27-
37. 
153 World Bank (1998), Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank ISBN 0-8213-4340-
8. On the World bank’s work on the empirical relationship between Human Rights and Governance and the 
Work of the World bank, see Daniel Kaufmann (2005), Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical 
Challenge, World Bank Institute. Further for a general discussion and analysis on Human Rights and 
Development, see Klaus Decker, Siobhan McInerney-Lankford and Caroline Sage: Human Rights and 
Equitable Development. Working Paper on file with the Author. 
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been underscored in this paper first that human rights have economic consequences and 
not only are they interrelated but also inadvertently affect the Bank’s relations with its 
member countries and other international organizations. 
  
The paper has presented a number of lessons from the Chad-Cameroon project. It shows 
that poor Bank member countries like Chad are affected by internal and regional political 
insecurities in the course of development arising largely from historic and prevalent 
political conditions and that this in essence presents the need for the World Bank to act in 
situations in which it is forbidden by its apolitical mandate. As a public – private 
partnership, the project shows that approach as one that can be extremely beneficial if 
exploited more often but that this approach inevitably calls to bear domestic political 
issues thereby requiring the Bank to get involved with these issues even though its 
Articles of Agreement explicitly state otherwise. The project shows that just the fact that 
the Bank is involved in a given project weighs heavily in the favor of poor countries and 
rich multinationals in raising finances. The Bank’s approach, structures and creativity in 
this project were innovative. They were flawed in many respects and had the flaws been 
dealt with, the approach would certainly be a laudable one.  
 
One concludes nevertheless that the inevitability with which the measures were put in 
place is worth emulating but this requires caution that the mistakes will not be repeated or 
taken lightly. It is however important for the Bank to remember that any other country in 
which it may get involved in extractive industry projects like oil exploitation is different 
from Chad and therefore a difference in approach may be of necessity. This paper has 
shown that this unique approach exposed a number of critical flaws in the Bank’s 
approach to human rights and vividly illustrates the need for a more comprehensive 
approach. 
 
Against the background of the historical factors that influenced the drafting of the 
provisions that have been analyzed in this paper, justification for the purposefully 
stringent wording of those provisions is appreciated and credited given the prevailing 
circumstances of the time. However, it is concluded that the provisions are not as wide to 
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allow inclusion of political issues, in particular human rights, concerns through a 
flexibility of interpretation. 
 
The paper has revisited the internal approach to the political prohibition question by 
analyzing the manner in which the Bank’s General Counsel have interpreted these 
provisions. These General Counsel have consistently adopted a purposive approach to 
conclude that some human rights are now allowed, if not included, in the Bank’s mandate 
as a result of its practice. However, this paper concludes that such an approach has 
rendered the Articles capable of manipulation to suit different circumstances. It is 
therefore concluded that without adjusting the wording of the mandate, to the undoubted 
extent that human rights are political issues, the Bank and its staff are prohibited from 
considering them in making its decisions.  
 
A lesson that can be drawn from the various approaches taken by the different General 
Counsel is that the relevance of and approach to human rights is a subjective issue. From 
the divergence of their views, it is concluded that continuous interpretation has not 
resolved the issue. It seems safe therefore to suggest that continuing with the approach of 
constantly interpreting the Articles will only leave the matter unsettled. Indeed as Ana 
Palacio (the present General Counsel), has clearly stated, human rights need to be 
included in the mandate of the Bank in a more explicit manner hence raising the issue of 
how this is to be done.154 
 
The paper has discussed a number of options on how to include human rights in the 
Bank’s mandate and concludes that a legal opinion by the General Counsel stating what 
political and human rights issues should be considered by the Bank would be the best 
alternative. However, as is pointed out, there are limitations to this approach. Firstly, such 
a legal opinion would not settle this issue with finality. These opinions largely differ and 
such an interpretation will only leave room for a later interpretation as Legal Counsel 
                                                 
154 Ana Palacio (2006), The Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank Article on the World Bank 
Development Outreach, World Bank Institute, October 2006 available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/0,,contentMDK:21106614
~menuPK:445640~pagePK:64020865~piPK:149114~theSitePK:445634,00.html accessed on 27/02/2007 
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change and others bring different perspectives to the debate. Secondly, the perception of 
human rights and their importance and relationship to development differs among 
countries. A critical question is which yardstick a General Counsel would use in 
determining which rights to include or exclude. 
 
4.2 Recommendations: Towards a Comprehensive Approach: 
The paper recommends a tripartite approach comprising of (1) debating and passing an 
amendment or attempt to amend the Bank’s Articles, (2) drafting and implementing a set 
of Operational Directives and Procedures on human rights, also stating how the Bank is 
to construe “economic” as distinguished from “political” factors and (3) the World Bank 
taking a leading role in advancing synergy between itself and other specialized UN 
agencies on a project-by-project basis.  Recognizing that there may not be the political 
will to pass the suggested amendment, this paper recommends that in the event of such a 
situation, the two latter suggestions would still hold. 
 
In accordance with Article VIII of the IBRD Articles, the Board should be invited to 
consider whether these provisions should be expunged in their entirety from the text of 
the Bank’s Articles.155 In the event that this is found untenable, an amendment to their 
text should be considered with the view of including human rights to the extent that their 
violation affects the Bank’s work or impedes the full realization of its intended benefits. 
The suggested amendment should focus on ways of encompassing human rights in the 
mandate of the Bank and not excluding countries with poor human rights records. As is, 
Article IV section 10 provides that: 
                                                 
155 The procedure for amending the IBRD Articles is set out in Article VIII, which provides: 
Article VIII Amendments: 
(a) Any proposal to introduce modifications in this Agreement, whether emanating from a 
member, a governor or the Executive Directors, shall be communicated to the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors who shall bring the proposal before the Board. If the proposed amendment is approved by the 
Board the Bank shall, by circular letter or telegram, ask all members whether they accept the proposed 
amendment. When three-fifths of the members, having eighty-five percent (1) of the total voting power, 
have accepted the proposed amendments, the Bank shall certify the fact by formal communication 
addressed to [all] members. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S as amended Feb 19, 1989 
available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049697~pagePK:439
12~menuPK:58863~piPK:36602,00.html  
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“The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any 
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character 
of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be 
relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially 
in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I.” 
 A suggested amended text in this case would provide that: 
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; 
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the 
member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant 
to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order 
to achieve the purposes stated in Article I. Provided however that where concerns 
of the violation of internationally accepted human right obligations may arise as 
a result of or during the process of the utilization of World Bank funding the Bank 
shall appraise such concerns in accordance with such guidelines as its members 
shall have agreed to, with the view to assess their impact on its mandate as stated 
in Article 1 and considering solutions to ensure that the funds it advances shall be 
used for the purposes for which they were loaned and to realize the highest 
attainable economic and development results from the funds it shall advance to its 
member countries.  
The process of debating this amendment, if attempted, can serve numerous purposes. 
Firstly, it ought to provide a clear and contemporary definition of what is considered 
“political” and how that is to be distinguished from “economic” factors. Secondly, how 
human rights are to be considered in juxtaposition with the Bank’s work and mandate.  
This would give the members the opportunity to agree on a unified way in which the 
Bank should draft a policy on how its work relates to human rights. In the process, the 
members would allay the question of which yardstick a General Counsel would use in 
determining which human rights to include or exclude from the Bank’s mandate.  
 
There are limitations to this recommendation. Firstly, it is genuinely considered a 
Herculean task to amend the Bank’s Articles, as that requires the amendment to be 
approved by a majority of three-fifths of the members, having eighty-five percent of the 
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total voting power.156 Secondly, different countries approach the importance of human 
rights from divergent viewpoints.157 It is also genuinely feared that amending the Articles 
would subject them to more frequent amendments, a factor on the pretext of which 
amending them is made purposefully difficult.158  
 
Be that as it may, human rights norms and obligations are widely accepted by most of the 
Bank’s member countries and one hopes that the proposal for an amendment would not 
face as much resistance as the issue of which human rights should be included in the 
Bank’s mandate. The recommendation to amend the Articles is premised on the view that 
even if the members rejected any suggested amendment, their participation in reaching 
such a decision would go a long way in shedding light on their perception of how the 
Bank should approach human rights. Ultimately, what is important is that the issue of 
how to deal with human rights vis-à-vis the Bank’s work and mandate is one that needs to 
be settled by its members in a participative manner and not through the interpretations of 
the General Counsel or other internal mechanisms. Legitimate as the fear of opening the 
Articles to frequent amendment may be, the preceding chapters of this work have 
demonstrated how long and how much it has taken for the debate on human rights and the 
Bank to evolve to the heights at which it is today. It has also been underscored that this 
development has not been in the abstract but against the backdrop of human rights as 
internationally recognized norms and obligations.  
 
Further, the Bank should come up with a more explicit set of guidelines as part of its 
Operational Procedures that captures the divergent perceptions and approaches of its 
members and publicly declares which human rights aspects the Bank will tackle and how. 
In light of the fact that there are internationally recognized standards to which the Bank’s 
members subscribe by virtue of their membership to the UN, one hopes that reaching 
agreement on what to include in the suggested Operational Procedures and Directives 
                                                 
156 Article VIII of the IBRD Articles of Agreement. 
157 A vivid illustration here is Cuba, which has since ceased to be a Bank member. Other cited examples are 
Sudan and Iran, see Ibrahim Shihata (2000): The World Bank in a Changing World. Vol. 3 Kluwer Law 
International, at p.182. see also the discussion in chapter 2 on whether to amend or not to amend the 
Articles. 
158 See chapter 2 discussion on whether to amend or not to amend the Articles. 
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may not be as difficult. Never the less, as already discussed above, engaging the members 
in the discussion of whether to amend the Articles or not would go a long way in 
informing this process and giving a clearer picture of what is a more acceptable approach 
for the Bank to take in dealing with human rights. Also, the Bank has in the recent past 
been engaged in dialogue with civil society and like in the case of Chad, in addition to its 
Inspection Panel, engaged external monitoring mechanisms. All these initiatives can be 
informative to the Bank in designing its Operational Procedures and Directives on human 
rights. 
 
As has been pointed out earlier in this paper, there is a need for the Bank to champion 
synergy with other UN agencies that are directly mandated to deal with specialized 
human rights issues. This would help the Bank to avoid capacity constraints by drawing 
from the extensive human and other resources of these organizations. Bradlow and 
Grossman have suggested useful, albeit more general, ways in which a similar approach 
can be undertaken and ably highlighted the legal basis on which this can be done.159 In 
addition, it is suggested that the Bank takes this approach on a project-by-project basis so 
as to avoid the problems that may result from using a one-size-fits all approach. A 
project-by-project approach would be most effective if prior to deciding whether to 
finance the project and formalizing any arrangements with the Borrower, the Bank first 
evaluates the potential human rights violations that may arise during or as a result of a 
project it is considering to finance in accordance with the Operational Procedures and 
Directives suggested above.  
 
Upon determining the risks involved, the Bank may then suggest ways it finds suitable to 
address such issues and in the same breath both exploit its mechanisms on popular 
consultation by seeking the views of the people likely to be affected and other 
stakeholders and civil society organization and, importantly, the views of the specialized 
UN agencies that may be directly relevant to the given concerns. Such an approach if 
adopted would partner development and the respect for and enforcement of human rights 
                                                 
159 D.D. Bradlow and C. Grossman (1996), Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: The A new 
Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF Human Rights Quarterly 17.3 411-442 at pp.434-440. 
 
 
 
 
  65
and in the process empower the populations of the borrowing countries. The difference 
between this approach and the existent mechanisms is that in this case, the Bank is 
expected to be more explicit in its human rights role as it would be acting under a 
liberalized mandate. It is also expected to be more accountable as the process involves 
more stakeholders and formally takes place before the project has been commenced. One 
hopes therefore that the international scrutiny would result into a higher level of 
accountability on the side of the Bank and its borrowers.   
 
One major potential weakness with this approach that must be guarded against is the 
possibility of the Bank or other organizations assuming that each project can be 
approached in a single manner, leading to the vices of the one-size-fits all approach. This 
is not to deny that in order to ensure equitable treatment of the Bank’s members, some 
form of “uniformity” would be needed in the long run. One hopes however, that the open 
involvement of civil society organizations, local populations and other stakeholders 
would offer some form of security against the risk of a one-size-fits-all approach due to 
the increase in accountability as alluded to above. 
 
It is the researcher’s belief that the foregoing recommendations, if adopted, can result in 
the Bank crafting creative and yet highly stringent measures to compel its borrowing 
members to comply with both their human rights obligations as well as their obligations 
to the Bank, hence enabling it to play a central role in promoting human rights without 
being curtailed by its Articles. As the world’s leading development institution, the Bank 
by unfettering its mandate and embracing a pro-human rights approach will go along way 
in realizing its mission of poverty eradication and salvaging millions from the tragic 
repercussions that poverty has visited on the populations of its poorer members. 
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